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In the 1990s, China’s has low-cost workforce and price advantage of low-end 
products gave rise to a rapid increase in exporting trade and GDP. The global labor 
market channels a large share of the workforce to developing countries, like China 
and Viet Nam, which has a negative effect on the labor market in developed countries, 
like the United States. Over the last ten years, China’s impressive economic growth 
has begun to slow. Labor-intensive industries have started to relocate from coastal 
areas to inland areas and even to other low-cost developing countries in search of 
cheaper workers. Also, due to the decline of purchase orders, factories, mines, and 
construction projects are closing down. With these changing conditions, employees’ 
rights are threatened with wages decreases, unpaid wages, and loss of compensation. 
According to data from the NGO (China Labor Bulletin), the number of strikes and 
labor protests reported in 2014 more than doubled to 1,378.1 In these strikes and labor 
protests, factory workers, taxi drivers, and teachers across the country demanded 
better treatment.2 Employees’ self-organized and initiated strikes and protests have 
become the main economic weapon used by workers.3 According to surveys on 
workers movements from 2011-2012, labor conflicts mostly occurred in 
manufacturing industries in the coastal areas of China, especially in the Guandong 
province.4 Motivating the increased labor strife are the workers’ demands, which fall 
                                                        
1 Alexandra Harney, China Labor Activists Say Facing Unprecedented Intimidation, REUTERS (Jan. 21, 
2015 12:47PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/01/21/us-china-labour-
idUSKBN0KU13V20150121?feedType=RSS&feedName=worldNews 
2 Labor unrest: Out Brothers, Out!, ECONOMIST, Jan. 31, 2015, available at 
http://www.economist.com/news/china/21641275-guangdong-province-pioneers-new-approach-
keeping-workers-happy-out-brothers-out. 
3 Zhongguo Gongren Yundong Guancha Baogao (2011-2012) (中国工人运动观察报告 (2011-2012)), 
CHINA LAB. BULL., 2 (June 18, 2013), http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/sites/default/files/2011-2012工人运
动报告.pdf. 
4 Id. at 3-4. 
 
2 
into three categories: asking for compensation due to factory closure, relocation, and 
transfer; asking for increased wages and unpaid wages; and asking for benefits from 
SOEs reform.5 The results of these demands are different: one-third of these demands 
did not have reported outcomes while 80 percent of the other demands had been 
resolved.6 Although the workers’ protests could entirely or partially satisfy workers’ 
demands in the end, some workers, especially the strike leaders, are routinely fired, 
and sometimes detained by police and charged with the crime of “disturbing the 
public order.” 7 Realizing workers’ demands cannot be ensured without greater 
protection in both law and policy. Moreover, the employer has begun to utilize 
strategies to lower business costs: cutting down on positions but increasing tasks per 
employee; decreasing tasks for workers inducing them to resign their positions; 
relocating the plant to low-cost areas; and using labor dispatch workers not in 
provisional, auxiliary or substitutive positions.8 These strategies prevent employees 
from obtaining fair compensation, benefits, and payment.  
In order to satisfy workers’ demands and create stronger policy for the PRC, 
drawing from the U.S.’s collective bargaining system, labor law, and case law 
precedents, I will make a comparative analysis of the protections for workers in labor 
laws and alternative dispute resolutions (arbitrations) in China and the United States. 
                                                        
5 Id. at 4-5. 
6 Id. at 22. 
7 Aaron Halegua, China's New Collective Bargaining Rule Is Too Weak To Ease Labour Conflicts, S. 
CHINA MORNING POST (Feb. 25, 2015 5:45PM), http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-
opinion/article/1723213/chinas-new-collective-bargaining-rule-too-weak-ease-labour 
8 Zhongguo Gongren Yundong Guancha Baogao (2011-2012), supra note 3, at 12; Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa (中华人民共和国劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law of the People’s 
Republic of China (2012 Amendment)] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., 
Dec. 28, 2012, effective Dec. 28, 2012) (Lawinfochina) (China), Art. 66. Art.66: “Labor dispatch is a 
supplementary form and shall exclusively apply to provisional, auxiliary or substitutive positions. 
‘Provisional position' as prescribed in the preceding paragraph means a position that exists for less than 
six months; ‘auxiliary position' means a non-major business position providing services to main 
business positions; and ‘substitutive position' means a position that may be held by any other employee 
on a substitutive basis during a certain period of time when the employee of the employer who 
originally holds the position is unable to work because such employee is undergoing full-time training, 
on vacation or for any other reason”.  
3 
Comparative analyses of labor laws and industrial relations can be a useful for labor 
law reforms in China for a variety of reasons.9 First, learning about other countries 
can help identify successful labor laws in those countries, and the manner in which 
the laws and institutions developed.10 Second, comparative studies are worthwhile in 
discovering commonalities among the surveyed countries to figure out any general 
structures between different societies and cultures, realizing that the national 
industrialization systems are becoming more uniform and varied in different ways 
under globalization.11 Third, comparative studies are useful to provide a particular 
country with recommendations for labor law reform in order to improve the 
performance of the industrial relations system.12 As for China, learning how the 
system in the United States operates could motivate and provide ideas to China in 
reviewing their current system with respect to efficiency and equity. 
In Part II of my thesis, I review the labor market in China and the United 
States and emphasize the significance of collective bargaining. As for China, 
collective bargaining (negotiation) between the union representing employees and the 
employer is necessary because in most cases employers are not willing to negotiate 
with their employees and strikes are costly and problematic for officials obsessed with 
maintaining harmonization and social stability.13 From an economic perspective, I   
then analyze the challenges of an imperfect labor market by discussing unequal 
bargaining power, unemployment, and the externalities and social costs of labor. With 
respect to the costs and benefits in the existing imperfect labor market, union 
attendance and regulations are important to maintain fair conditions of employment. 
                                                        
9 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, Labor Law and Industrial Peace: A Comparative Analysis of the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan under the Bargaining Model, 8 TUL. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 117, 118 (2000). 
10 Id. at 119. 
11 Id. at 118. 
12 Id. at 118-19. 
13 Halegua, supra note 7. 
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In order to satisfy workers’ demands, discussing the protections in labor laws and 
alternative dispute resolutions in both countries is especially significant for China in 
reviewing its own protections.  
In the following chapters, I conduct a comparative analysis of the labor laws 
and arbitration regulations in China and the United States by discussing the definition 
of employees, workers’ organizing rights, remedies for employees, and the challenges 
of China’s arbitration system. In Part III, I make a comparative analysis of labor laws 
in China and the United States by means of discussing the definition of employees, 
the basic right of employees to participate in union’s activities, and remedies for 
improper behavior of employers. In Part IV, after a brief review of the arbitration 
laws in both countries, I discuss the current challenges in China referring to the U.S. 
arbitration models.  
II. A REVIEW OF THE LABOR MARKET – THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 
A. THE LABOR MARKET AND THE WORKERS’ DEMANDS OF THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 
The initial labor system was set up by the PRC in the 1950s was adopted from 
the Soviet Model and based on a centrally planned economy, including labor and the 
administration of wages.14 At that time, the PRC employed a “price-scissors” policy 
based on the Soviet Model in order to accumulate capital and ensure profits for 
enterprises. Under this policy, the government maintained low agricultural prices 
and low rural and urban wages while maintaining high prices for manufactured goods 
                                                        
14 JOHN B. KNIGHT & LINA SONG, TOWARDS A LABOR MARKET IN CHINA 13 (Oxford: Oxford Univ. 
Press 2005). 
5 
permitting for the centrally planned re-investment of profits into state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs).15 In this way, not only did rural peasants effectively pay for 
industrialization at the expense of their own interests, but urban workers’ rights 
were also undermined by the policy.16 Under these conditions, the Chinese labor 
market system was an administrated labor system rather than a labor market.17  
In 1978, Deng Xiaoping proposed a remarkable process of economic reform in 
China. Under the direction of reformers, China changed from a “Central Planned 
Economy” to a “Market Economy”. During the process of economic reform, the 
labor market shifted away from an administrated labor system. The transition 
focused first on increasing economic activity in specific areas with the 
expectation that the prosperity in one area would assist and spread to other 
sectors – prosperity to some, then to most, then to all.18 The labor reforms began at 
this time by means of abandoning the system of labor allocation, requiring or 
permitting real wages to rise, and introducing “performance-related wage 
incentives/distribution wages according to performance (an lao fen pei).”19   
At the same time, the workforce transferred from rural to urban areas. In the 
mid-1980s this migration was of particular importance due to the rapid growth of the 
urban economy and the slow growth of the urban-born workforce under the one-child 
policy.20 In the 1990s, the growth of the urban labor force was faster, 3.6 per cent per 
annum, than the growth of the rural labor force, 0.2 percent, resulting in continued 
                                                        
15 Id. at 18.  
16 Jiandao Cha De Jingji Xue: Guanyu Zhongguo De Shizheng Yanjiu (剪刀差的经济学：关于中国
的实证研) [Economics of the Price Scissors: Empirical Studies] Zhongguo Jingji Jiaoyu Keyan Wang 
(中国经济教育科研网) [CHINA ECON. RES. INTERNET] (Apr. 7, 2008), 
http://economics.cenet.org.cn/show-2204-33649-1.html. 
17 KNIGHT & SONG, supra note 14, at 17.  
18 Xiaoping Deng proposed this concept in 1985.  
19 KNIGHT & SONG, supra note 14, at 21. 
20 Id. at 22. 
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rural-to-urban migration and the reclassification of some areas as urban.21 Because of 
this rural-to-urban migration, the state-owned sector absorbed 58 percent of new 
urban employees in 1988; however, by 1997 the figure was down to 32 percent.22  
The rural/urban labor redistribution was also required by China’s rapid 
economic growth. The rapid growth of the Chinese GDP, about 10 percent per annum 
between 2003 and 2012,23 exceeded the labor force growth rate of about 2.7 percent 
per annum over these same years.24 According to Figure 1(1) below, Shenzhen has the 
largest private sector and also the highest proportion of migrant workers in total 
employment.25  Since the reforms started, China’s rapid growth has been driven by 
internal labor mobility. This is confirmed by empirical studies showing that 
workforce mobility and reallocation increased GDP by about 16 to 22 percent.26 By 
the end of 2009, China had a total of 229.8 million rural migrant workers. Among 
them, 145.3 million rural migrant workers worked outside of their hometowns for 
over six months.
27
 In the late 1990s, in order to pose a lesser threat to society and 
maintain political stability, the PRC government decided that unemployment should 
be transferred to the rural areas.28 The government restricted the recruitment and re-
employment of rural migrants, and unemployed urban-hukou residents were given 
priority by urban job centers responding to the widespread layoffs of urban 
                                                        
21 Id. at 33. 
22 Id. at 24. 
23 “GDP Growth (annual%) 2005:11.31%; 2006: 12.70%; 2007: 14.20%; 2008: 9.60%; 2009: 9.21%; 
2010: 10.45%; 2011: 9.30%; 2012: 7.8%.” For more information, see Zhongguo Tongji Nianjian (中国
统计年鉴) [NEW STATISTICAL YEARBOOKS], CHINA, CHINA STAT. PRESS, APP. II 2-4 (2013), available at 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2013/indexch.htm. 
24 KNIGHT & SONG, supra note 14, at 31. 
25 Id. at 90-1. 
26 Dewen Wang, Rural-Urban Migration and Policy Responses in China: Challenges and Options, 
(ILO Asian Reg’l Programme on Governance of Lab. Migration, Working Paper No.15, 2008), 
available at http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---asia/---ro-
bangkok/documents/publication/wcms_160569.pdf. 
27 Labour Migration, INT’L LABOUR ORG., http://www.ilo.org/beijing/areas-of-work/labour-
migration/lang--en/index.htm (last visited July 3, 2015).  
28 KNIGHT & SONG, supra note 14, at 22. 
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employees.29 Economic reform also transformed State-owned enterprises (SOEs)30 
from classical SOEs to privatized SOEs.31 Due to the low profits and inefficiency of 
State-owned Enterprises, a number of SOEs closed, creating a large number of lay off 
employees (xiagang).32  
Figure 1(1) Basic data on the four cities33 
Official statistics number of 
employees (Population 1994 
million) 
Beijing Shenzhen Suzhou Wuhan 
Total 2,825 557 1,230 996 
Migrant 561 193 213 193 
Non-migrant 2,264 363 1,016 803 
Migrants as a percentage of total city employment 
All 19.9 34.6 17.3 19.3 
Production or supporting 
worker 
22.7 44.7 26.4 26.9 
Skilled worker 25.5 30.3 6.7 15.2 
Managerial and technician 
staff 
2.0 1.3 0.6 0.7 
 
The layoffs in the state sector, starting in the mid-1990s, intensified in 1997 
and continued to worsen.34 Some SOEs survived, and many of the smaller SOEs 
                                                        
29 Id. 
30 An SOE is a legal entity that undertakes commercial activities on behalf of an owner government. 
31 China has over 150,000 SOEs at the national and local level, ranging from well-known behemoths 
like China Petro, China Mobile, and China Shipping to smaller provincial-level firms that often branch 
out into odd market areas such as hotels and shopping malls. Many of these companies have serious 
internal problems, including mismanagement, inefficiency, and inaccurate accounting methods. For 
more information, see Shannon Tiezzi, Xi’s New Year’s Resolution: Reform China’s State-Owned 
Enterprises, THE DIPLOMAT, Jan. 14, 2015, http://thediplomat.com/2015/01/xis-new-years-resolution-
reform-chinas-state-owned-enterprises/ 
32 Laid-off workers still retain their relationship with their state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and receive 
a minimum subsidy for two years. The government, however, does not count them in the 
unemployment statistics for those two years, nor do they count the hundreds of millions of unemployed 
rural Chinese. 
33 KNIGHT & SONG, supra note 14, at 90-91. 
8 
declared bankruptcy during this time. Displaced workers who had joined the state 
sector before 198535 were xia gang employees, but still retained their relationship 
with the SOE. The SOEs established “Re-employment centers” (RECs) providing 
those xia gang employees with retraining, job searching and unemployment 
benefits.36 The SOEs were allowed to implement a unilateral buy-out offer, regarding 
how much compensation xia gang workers received based on the length of time they 
have served.  
Xia gang employees, in most circumstances, only obtain one-time economic 
compensation according to their length of service, and then become officially 
unemployed.37 If their employers contributed to an unemployment insurance fund on 
their behalf, the workers were authorized as unemployment and to receive 
unemployment benefits.38 Since Re-employment Centers were phased out by 2005, 
however, xia gang workers have been empowered to register as unemployed to obtain 
unemployment benefits.39 All unemployed workers have incentives to find new jobs 
elsewhere including the non-state sector or self-employment, although those who 
have more skills or are young likely have an easier time finding a new job and gaining 
                                                                                                                                                              
34 KNIGHT & SONG, supra note 14, at 29. 
35 Zhonggong Zhongyang Guanyu Jingji Tizhi Gaige De Jueding (中共中央关于经济体制改革的决
定) [The Central Committee of CPC's Decision on Economic System Reform] (promulgated by the 
P.R.C. the Third Plenary Session of the Twelfth Central Committee, Oct. 20, 1984, effective 1985). 
36 Ray Brooks & Ran Tao, China's Labor Market Performance and Challenges 16 (Washington, D.C.: 
IMF, Asia and Pacific Dept., Working Paper WP/03/210, 2003). 
37 Gongren Jiti Xingdong Shiyi Nian (工人集体行动十一年：基于 553个个案的分析) [Empirical 
Studies on Collective Actions for Eleven Years], CHINA LAB. BULL., 5 (Dec. 21, 2011), 
http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/sites/default/files/2000-
2010_Chinese_workers_movement_research_report_1.pdf 
38 KNIGHT & LINA SONG, supra note 14, at 29. 
39 Guanyu Qieshi Zuohao Guoyou Qiye Xiagang Zhigong Jiben Shenghuo Baozhang Zhidu Binggui 
Youguan Gongzuo De Tongzhi De Yaoqiu (关于切实做好国有企业下岗职工基本生活保障制度向
失业保险制度并轨有关工作的通知的要求) (promulgated by the MINISTRY OF HUM. RESOURCES & 
SOC. SEC. CHINA (MOHRSS) Feb. 24, 2005, effective Feb. 24, 2005). 
9 
a better salary. Protests by displaced workers over their benefits and compensation 
increased over the course of the increased layoff period.40  
The surviving SOEs increased productivity at the expense of layoff workers’ 
rights and benefits. At the same time, workers realized that they have a right to 
demand improved working conditions. By the end of 2009, China had a total of 229.8 
million rural migrant workers. Among them, 145.3 million rural migrant workers 
worked outside their hometowns for a period over six months.41 Due to lack of 
available collective bargaining mechanisms, intensive strikes happened in the summer 
of 2010. Among the striking workers, the majority were migrant workers born in the 
1980s or 1990s.42  
In 2001, China’s WTO participation drove it to reform its labor market with a 
new perspective. As part of the new reforms, depending on the quality of their lands, 
some rural workers were able to cultivate higher value-added crops, which made other 
workers living on marginal land more subject to poverty and/or urban migration.43 In 
particularly, rural workers in mid-western provinces lost their job because of a 
skewed massive surplus of agricultural workers and less need for rural labor. Farmers, 
therefore, came to leave their lands, going to urban areas, especially coastal areas, to 
find a job.44  
As a result of the rural-to-urban migration, job loss reached 14.5 million – 13 
million workers in rural areas and 1.5 million in urban areas (for the most part in the 
                                                        
40 CHINA LAB. BULL., supra note 37, at 4.  
41 Labor Migration, ILO COUNTRY OFFICE FOR CHINA, http://www.ilo.org/beijing/areas-of-
work/labour-migration/lang--en/index.htm. 
42 Migrant workers in China refer to the workers who migrate within a country and are working far 
away from their hometown. 
43 Brooks & Tao, supra note 36, at 19. 
44 Shulian Zhou & Houkai Wei (周叔莲 魏后凯), Jiaru WTO Dui Zhongguo Quyue Jingji Fazhan De 
Yingxiang (加入 WTO对中国区域经济发展的影响) [Joining in the WTO: Impacts on Chinese 
Economics], THE MODERN ECONOMIC RESEARCH (现代经济讨论) 3, 4 (2002). 
10 
automobile and machinery industries).45 In the medium-term of WTO accession, by 
means of restructuring, benefits in higher job growth are estimated at about 0.5-0.75 
percent annually.46 A sizable portion of China's increase in world market share has 
resulted in job growth where resources of labor-intensive industries shifted from less 
competitive capital-intensive industries.47 In the long-term, China’s increase in world 
market share induced a massive relocation of foreign manufacturing to coastal China, 
drawing a large number of jobs to China in the global labor market.  
Due to the low wages in China and lack of a practical means to collective 
bargaining, strikes in China are on the rise.48 China’s strikes are unique in that most 
strikes are economic strikes occurring at the onset of disputes with little negotiation 
occurring between labor and management. This is different than in the United States 
where strikes usually occur as a last resort after collective bargaining fails. However, 
there is also a challenge for developed countries like the United States to confront 
under the global labor market. Workers in those developed countries have limited 
redress in global market, weakening their bargaining power.49 For instance, in the 
United States, manufacturing workers have begun to lose their jobs to low-cost 
foreign countries. American unions cannot use their bargaining power to organize 
employees outside of the United States, even if they worked in a U.S-owned 
enterprise in a developing country, since the NLRA only regulates domestic 
business.50 Thus, on the one hand, the low-cost workforce and price advantage of 
low-end products in developing countries, such as China and Viet Nam, create rapid 
                                                        
45 Brooks & Tao, supra note 36, at 19. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
48 Strike Map, CHINA LAB. BULL., http://maps.clb.org.hk/strikes/en (last visited July 6, 2015). 
49 Katherine S. Newman, Great Recession and the Pressure on Workplace Rights, 88 CHI.- KENT L. 
REV. 529, 530-31 (2013). 
50 Charles B. Craver, The Relevance of the NLRA and Labor Organizations in the Post-Industrial 
Global Economy, 57 LAB. L.J. 133, 136-37 (2006).  
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developments in those country’s exports trade, which gives rise to negative impacts 
on the labor market of developed countries. On the other hand, in China, the ability to 
collective bargaining is also needed to balance interests and alleviate strife. With 
regard to establishing a detailed mechanism of collective bargaining and unionism, it 
is worthwhile to illustrate a typical picture of the labor market in the United States 
since 1900. Unionism, as one of a number of significant factors, has made impressive 
impacts on the labor market and the global economy. The conventional wisdom is that 
unionism declines when the economy declines. The obvious exception to this general 
rule was the Great Depression of the 1930’s when employers reneged on implicit 
promises of job security and benefits creating a greater need for collective bargaining 
and regulation.51 Generally, union membership in the United States displayed a ∩-
shaped pattern including the rise of membership of the non-agricultural labor force 
during 1913-1955 and the fall of this rate from 1955 through the 21st century.52 
Notably, union membership experienced the most rapid expansion in U.S. history 
from 1935 to the mid-1950s when the union destiny rate increased from 13.2 per cent 
to 34.7 percent.53 The percent of the nonagricultural labor force in organized unions 
surpassed the absolute number of workers in labor organizations.54  
The NLRA was amended in 1947 (under the Taft-Hartley Act) and 1959 
(under the Landrum-Griffin Act), in order to limit and regulate the power of labor 
unions to implement unfair labor practices and to carry out secondary activity.55 The 
union leaders took action to reverse the status quo, merging the AFL and CIO into the 
                                                        
51 LABOR LAW IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORKPLACE 107 (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al. eds., 2d ed. 
2009). 
52 Emin M. Dinlersoz & Jeremy Greenwood, The Rise and Fall of Unions in the U.S. 4-7 (NAT’L 
BUREAU OF ECON. RES., Working Paper No. 18079, 2012).  
53 Craver, supra note 50, at 133; PHILIP TAFT, ORGANIZED LABOR IN AMERICAN HISTORY, N.Y.: 
HARPER & ROW 471-72 (1st ed. 1964).  
54 “The absolute number of individuals in labor organizations grew from 17,000,000 in 1955 to 
22,000,000 in 1980. The percent of nonagricultural labor force participants in unions declined from 35 
to 23.” For more information, see Craver, supra note 50, at 133, 147. 
55 Craver, supra note 50, at 133.  
12 
AFL-CIO because they believed it would be much stronger and effective as a 
solidarity organization.56  
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the American economy had changed 
radically. Low-cost relocation and cost-saving technological developments weakened 
most of the traditional industrial unions like the Auto Workers, the Steel Workers, and 
the Electrical Workers.57 A relatively new industrial union – Change to Win – formed 
in 2005, when a number of union officials58 who were not satisfied with AFL-CIO 
and felt the leaders had not done enough to halt the decline of the labor movement, 
withdrew from their original traditional union.59 During these times, unions were 
devoted to increasing wages, lowering profits, and raising employees’ voices, 
possibly having a positive effect on firms’ productivity.60 Unions also tend to 
decrease profitability, which is why firms tend to not like unions. However, 
increasing or decreasing the costs to maintain profitability will have different 
consequences for social welfare.61 Generally, unions’ greatest contribution to a 
society is raising workers’ share of income and workers’ voice in the firm and 
government. Unions can stimulate the economy by raising workers’ wages because 
they can afford to buy more goods. As the positive aspect of unions can offset the 
negative aspects regarding social goods and the economy, the ongoing decline of 
unionization is not good for unions, their members, or society overall because unions 
do much social good.62 As analyzed above, collective bargaining and unionism are 
necessary under the worldwide labor market in both the United States and China. 
                                                        
56 Jennifer Schramm, The Future of Unions, SOC’Y HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. 2 (2005), 
https://www.shrm.org/Research/FutureWorkplaceTrends/Documents/Visions1005.pdf. 
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B. CHALLENGES IN THE IMPERFECT LABOR MARKETS 
The economy plays an important role in the changing labor market in terms of 
both mobility and flexibility. It is important to analyze the labor market together with 
both microeconomics and macroeconomics. Simply using the model of neoclassical 
economic theory cannot comprehensively analyze imperfect labor markets because 
the model assumes that labor markets work perfectly in complete competition. 
Institutional Law and Economics (IL&E) theory, however, is much more convincing, 
assuming that markets have gaps. The set of fundamental IL&E assumptions, such as 
purpose of an economy, institutions, power, and modes of coordination, has an 
orientation to labor and employment issues.63 Thus, this chapter applies IL&E theory 
to analyze labor markets in China and America. Alternatively, I apply macroeconomic 
theory to analyze labor markets under global conditions. There are three main 
challenges in labor markets: unequal bargaining power, unemployment, and 
externalities and social costs of labor, indicating that costs and benefits of employee 
organizations and regulations between labor and management are needed in the 
process of collective bargaining.64  
1. Unequal Bargaining Power 
Imperfect labor markets and unequal resources and rights indicate that 
workers suffer inequality of bargaining power.65 In a perfect labor market, 
competition forces firms to provide an optimal agreement including such terms and 
conditions so as to keep or recruit their workforce, while employees can quit and find 
                                                        
63 Bruce E. Kaufman, Labor Law and Employment Regulation: Neoclassical and Institutional 
Perspectives 25-27 (Andrew Young SCH. POL’Y STUD. Research Paper No. 08-27, 2008), available at 
SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=1260837 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1260837. 
64 See generally, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS (Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al. 
eds., 2d ed. 2009). 
65 Kaufman, supra note 63, at 30.  
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jobs somewhere else.66 However the real labor market is not always perfect. Within 
an imperfect labor market, either employees or employers have the advantage.67 Most 
often, the employer has a skewed power over workers. Compared to the power given 
to management, workers feel pressured to bargain with employers.  
For example, in an imperfect labor market, a firm sets wages rather than the 
impersonal forces of demand and supply. In particular, since the economic reforms in 
China, enterprises have become increasingly flexible in setting wages by means of 
negotiation with a trade union, and enterprises have obtained more power to drive 
wages down. Since Chinese economic reform, China has changed its labor market 
from an administrated labor system to a mediated market system. A large number of 
rural migrants have moved to urban areas, making the supply curve in those areas 
shift to the right.  
Figure 1(2) demonstrates this problem.  In the figure, wage (W1) is lower than 
the competitive wage (W2) at the point of employment (L1) (meaning that a firm only 
employs workers when doing so will increase profits up to the point L1 where 
MRP=MCL and not beyond). This results in a rise of exploitation of labor.68 The firm, 
therefore, may cut down wages or pay a competitive wage (W2) at the expense of 
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Further, regardless of whether labor markets are perfect or not, labor may also 
face unequal bargaining power because the distribution of resources and rights favor 
employers.71 Employers control ownership and property rights, creating unequal 
bargaining power within the market, particularly under the employment-at-will 
doctrine (shifting the supply curve to the right).72 Moreover, both employers and 
consumers have self-interests in low wages, which improve their welfare at the 
expense of labor.73 Because the employment relationship has always been unequal 
and exploited, and firms have the market power to set wages, employee organizations 
focus on raising wages and lowering prices, which means more income equality and a 
greater employee voice in the economy and society. 
Owing to the unequal power between labor and management, “good faith” 
exchanges of relevant information during bargaining should be required. Imperfect 
information or strategic behavior is another aspect of an imperfect labor market, and 
                                                        
70 Kaufman, supra note 63, at 32. 
71 Id. at 33. 
72 Id. at 35. 
73 Id. 
16 
is one of the causes of strikes.74 The outcome of a strike can be improved when the 
parties act for their collective interests, and cooperate; however, if both parties only 
follow their individual interests and are inflexible, a strike will waste a portion of the 
cooperative surplus.75  
The United States government, therefore, may seek to promote cooperation 
and discourage costly strategic behavior or strikes by means of prohibiting such 
behavior and enforcing it with suitable fines, or creating laws governing collective 
bargaining to avoid costly strategic behavior.76 For example, the government 
disallows secondary boycotts to limit unions’ bargaining power to impose costs on 
employers.77 
Contrary to the U.S., China’s strikes are distinct, and doubled in 2014 with a 
continuing shrinkage of the labor force. In this situation, workers may have a stronger 
bargaining position, but the government’s political power still needs to be 
reconsidered so as not to rely solely on officials’ desire for economic growth and 
stability. Instead, the government, as a third party in the process of strikes, should 
promote cooperation and discourage costly strikes. The existence of unequal 
bargaining power signals that unions in the process of collective bargaining and 
regulations could be very useful to govern imperfect markets with unequal resources.  
2. Unemployment   
During the post-war period, unemployment was generally low in the United 
States. The full employment is located at the production possibility frontier, 
demonstrating that the resources are being used efficiently in the production of goods 
                                                        
74 LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra note 64, at 118-19. 
75 Id. at 119-21. 
76 Id. at 120-22.  
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and an output is accessible with the given inputs. Unemployment can consist of 
frictional unemployment, or demand deficient unemployment. Frictional 
unemployment occurs at full employment when there are always some people 
between jobs. Demand deficient unemployment occurs when firms layoff workers as 
a result of decreasing demand for a particular good. In order to keep the economy 
closer to full employment, from the IL&E perspective, employment regulation has a 
positive role in stabilizing the economy.78 
With the rise of the global economy and new technological information, 
another type of unemployment, involuntary unemployment proposed by Keynes in 
1936, exists in most developing countries. Involuntary unemployment refers to a 
worker having the will to accept the prevailing wage yet is unemployed, meaning that 
unemployment shifts further inside the production possibility frontier at point X in 
Figure 2(1).  
Figure 2(1) 
 
                                                        














In a primary labor market, which has higher wages, capital and knowledge-intensive 
sectors resist wage cuts.79 If the higher wages continue or are set above the market 
wages, in a semi-chronic condition, there will be an increasing excess of labor supply 
in the primary labor market.80 Therefore, some workers in the primary labor market 
will be unemployed because of the excess supply of labor. Under this situation, if 
wages go down below the market wages in order to balance the supply and demand 
curve, there will be chronic unemployment and a shortage of jobs at high wages firms, 
likely resulting in a portion of the job seekers shifting to the low-wage secondary 
labor market.81 The supply of secondary labor market workers, thus, will increase to 
the rightward of the supply curve and further lower wages.  
Involuntary unemployment has happened in China where wages have been 
increasing since the last century. The wage increase made the supply curve shift to the 
right; in particular, there is a serious imbalance in the labor market with labor 
shortages or unemployment in some sectors and over-supply of labor in others. On the 
one hand, in order to cut the labor costs of enterprises, for example, the majority of 
workers currently in SOEs are not directly employed by the enterprises but rather by 
an employment agency named Paiqian firms (a firm that employs workers but not use 
their labor force) created by that enterprise in order to cut costs.82 Those workers who 
have signed a dispatched contract are transferred to secondary labor markets and 
obtain lower wages. Although the Chinese Labor Contract Law proposes, “equal pay 
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for equal work”83, it is hard to require enterprises to implement this general rule 
because the definition of equal work is so vague.  
Bidding down the wage rate to gain employment, in general, is not an efficient 
way to facilitate the supply and demand situation or alleviate worsened 
unemployment, even in a perfect competitive economy.84 In other words, bidding 
down wages cannot solve the supply and demand problem. Moreover, as wages go 
down, the price of production will soon decrease and the real wage may actually 
increase rather than decrease—which is what happened during the Great 
Depression.85 Although the real wages increase, the purchase power of individuals is 
deficient given the excess supply of production. On the other hand, wages reduction 
can actually lead to a destabilizing downward helix in wages and prices, leading to a 
capitalist catastrophe.86 A fall in wages below the original equilibrium level, like what 
happened in the Great Recession, results in a destabilizing downward spiral of wages 
because the aggregate supply has a more elastic negative slope than the aggregate 
demand curve.87 As for the aggregate demand curve, the decline of wages decreases 
household income and expenditure leads to leftward labor demand curves (D1 to D3 
in Figure 2(2)), even if there is a positively sloped supply curve.88 Wage reduction, 
therefore, has a negative impact on preventing a deflationary spiral and does not move 
towards the production possibility frontier.89  
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Figure 2 (2)90 
 
On the other hand, in China, firms actually increase wages for formal workers 
in order to recruit enough workers. The conventional understanding was that if money 
wages increase it would induce national consumption ability. However, what actually 
happened is that the high national saving rate resulted in poor consumption ability. 
This remarkably high national saving rate has supported China’s high-investment, 
export-led growth model. Once China’s export-led growth model is challenged by 
labor-cost increases, from a macroeconomic perspective, enterprises might lose their 
share in the global market. The response of the industries in the south and east coastal 
provinces has been either to devote to wage increases and working condition 
improvements, or to relocate to lower labor cost areas. 91 Wages in the remaining 
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industries have increased by about 73 percent from 2004 to 2014 in Figure 3,92 which 
should feed more domestic consumption and production. 
Figure 3: Source from MOHRSS, China 93 
 
However, workers in these industries still have insufficient wages to improve 
their consumption ability because their wages only cover basic subsistence. Under 
such conditions, wage negotiation with the help of an employee organization would 
probably raise wages and domestic consumption and give workers a larger say in the 
economy and public policy. Therefore, wage negotiation between labor and 
management with the help of an employee union organization in China is very 
important and may help to balance interests in an efficient way.  
Labor mobility is another important factor to solve the unemployment 
problem and balance the supply and demand curve. There is a specific condition in 
China that warrants discussion. Unemployment does not include xiagang workers, 
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which means there is a special unemployment phenomenon named underemployment. 
According to the International Labor Organization, China’s unemployment statistics 
do not include a proportion of layoff workers (xiagang) because these workers still 
maintain an employment relationship with their employer even though they do not 
work anymore.94 Some of these workers might work in other informal sectors as part-
time workers, and are regarded as underemployed workers. This is to say that 
unemployment rates are actually higher than the official data purports, excluding 
workers who suffer from underemployment. The unemployment rate, thus, does not 
comprehensively indicate underemployment conditions in China. Moreover, 
underemployment has been a significant problem for over a decade without much 
improvement, and requires a solution.  
In order to resolve unemployment in urban areas, Hukou policy was set up in 
the mid-1950s to control labor mobility and flexibility. Unless the labor force in a 
particular province could not be found locally, employers were not allowed to recruit 
workers from another province at that time. There was a change in the Hukou system 
in 1997, allowing migrants to obtain “urban hukou” status if they had a stable income 
or owned a house in small towns and cities. A further reform occurred in 2001 – a 
person having a stable job or a residence could gain a hukou in more than 20,000 
small towns and cities, while keeping their rights to use land in the countryside.95 In 
the end, the Hukou system actually had a negative impact on labor mobility. For 
example, in 2004 some labor-intensive industries located in eastern and southern 
China could not recruit employees because of the limitation of Hukou, resulting in an 
“insufficient supply of the labor.” Thus, labor mobility is important in China to 
improve the current unemployment problem.  
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From a macroeconomic perspective, a further step should be considered – a 
macroeconomic stabilization measure. In the U.S., the New Deal labor program 
including the Social Security Act (SSA), National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), and 
Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) has existed since 1935.96 Most of the New Deal 
labor laws were enacted to protect employment conditions from the mass 
unemployment of the 1930s. Employee unions play an important role in the process 
of these laws. However, problems can arise if there is no regulation on employee 
unions; the union may shift to “monopoly creating”97 and create greater negative 
impacts such as lower productivity, inflation, and competitiveness.98 With respect to 
union power, regulations are useful to minimize or maximize the power of unions to 
produce more equitable results.99 For example, when union power was too weak in 
the 1930s, the Wagner Act was enacted to promote union power; when union power 
was too strong, however, the Taft-Hartley Amendments were passed to restrain union 
power. In sum, the analysis of unemployment shows that efficient regulations can 
protect the labor force from unemployment situations. Compared with the laws in the 
United States, the Employment Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China100 
relies on the government to promote employment, which lacks rules on attendance of 
an employee union, not to mention regulating unions. Other labor laws in China, such 
as the Labor Contact Law and Trade Union Law, involve employee unions in, but 
there are still problems with the process of collective negotiation, which will be 
analyzed in the next chapter.  
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3. Externalities and the Social Costs of Labor 
Although externalities affect both sides of in the labor market, they have a 
considerably negative effect on workers; notably, employers can often shift private 
production costs onto workers, their families, and other third parties as a form of 
social cost.101 Since social cost102 includes fundamental human and social rights in the 
workplace, the fact that these rights have no market value and are therefore do not 
enter into enterprise resource planning and human resources practices, employment 
regulation cost shift in order to prevent or redress injured parties.103 A shift of social 
labor cost is promoted by a large supply of labor in the market. For example, in the 
United States, large-scale immigration has transferred into the nation. As a result, in 
order to balance the supply and demand curve of the labor market, wages may have to 
fall to such an extent that it will not cover the minimum subsistence cost of labor.104 
In China, large numbers of rural migrants transferred to urban areas, causing firms to 
displace formal employees by means of recruiting a cheaper labor force from rural 
areas. Given that the labor market is not full employment, it is easy for firms, and then 
consumers, to shift the burden of labor costs to others, such as workers who are 
underpaid by firms with labor market power.105 Workers, therefore, should be granted 
legal or human rights with the help of a union to address the social wage vanishing 
externality/social cost problem.106 Regulation of the employment labor market also 
facilitates greater economic efficiency and maintains the economy on the production 
possibility frontier.107 In particular, without any employment regulation, greater 
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insecurity makes workers less productive.108 Thus, externalities and social costs of 
labor indicate that regulations are an efficient way to satisfy workers’ demands and 
promote productivity.  
In conclusion, from these three challenges, it is clear that regulations on 
collective bargaining are important in an imperfect labor market. During the process 
of collective bargaining, unions are necessary to balance bargaining power and 
improve employment conditions by means of raising wages and lowering prices with 
an ambiguous impact on total productivity. Regarding the costs and benefits of 
employee organizations, unions raise wages and lower prices at the expense of lower 
profits, giving employers an incentive to flee to non-union workplaces. As for China, 
employee organizations would probably raise wages and domestic consumption and 
provide workers with a larger voice in the economy and public policy. To some 
degree, it might give some employers motive to move inland or other low-cost labor 
countries, like Viet Nam. From my perspective, the benefits of employee 
organizations outweigh their costs in the process of collective bargaining.  
 
III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS IN THE 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND UNITED STATES 
A. OVERVIEW OF LABOR LAWS ON THE PROTECTIONS OF WORKER'S 
DEMANDS 
There are three types of laws governing China’s labor standards: statutory 
laws, administrative laws, and international laws, and most of them were adopted in 
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the last two decades.109 Statutory laws are enacted by the National People’s Congress 
and its standing committee. The Labor Law of 1994 was the first comprehensive labor 
standards law in China. Although the law covers minimum wage, child labor, working 
hours, protection of women, forced labor, collective bargaining and collective 
contracts, over time pay, and many other areas,110 but a lack of supporting policies 
and laws prevented the implementation of the law. The Labor Law has been revised 
since the Labor Contract Law was passed in 2008 and went into effected in 2009. In 
2013, Section 2 of Chapter 5 of the Labor Contract Law concerning worker dispatch 
service was revised. The Trade Union Law of 1992 addressed labor unions including 
collective contracts, settlement of labor disputes, and management decisions of 
workers. In order to encourage union participation by workers, the Reform of the 
Trade Union Law of 2001, added to Article 3 that prohibits and limits improper 
behavior that attempts to impede workers from joining or forming unions. The Law 
also added to Article 10 that requires enterprises to establish unions at their plants if 
the number of members is more than 25, otherwise, enterprises may establish unions. 
More importantly, the law added a chapter on legal responsibilities regulating 
improper conduct that violates the laws. With the enactment of this law, China has 
established the largest network of trades unions with memberships currently 
exceeding 150 million up to the middle of year 2006.111 Unions in State sectors are all 
unionized with a high percentage of participation, while non-state sectors in urban 
areas are partially unionized.112  
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Due to the insufficiency of statutory law within particular areas, Chinese 
administrative agencies have enacted administrative laws to regulate a particular field. 
Administrative law is also an important means to amend the existing statutory law. 
The Provisions on Collective Contracts (1994) was issued to regulate the particular 
field of collective contracts, but was superseded by the Provisions on Collective 
Contracts (2004). The Provisions on Collective Contracts (2004) added new chapters 
on the contents of collective negotiation, the representatives of collective negotiation, 
and the changing of collective contracts.  
There has been increasing international pressure on China regarding its labor 
standards, since China entered into WTO. The International Labor Organization 
(ILO), the United Nation’s labor agency, has developed a set of core labor standards 
and a tripartite system. In 2001, China created a national tripartite system 
(‘sanfangjizhi’) to deal with serious industrial relations strife. 113 However, the 
Chinese tripartite system is not use efficient because the government authority in this 
system is not neutral and independent from the labor relationship between labor and 
management.114  
In the United States, the Wagner Act (1953) was issued in order to support 
unionization, collective bargaining, and reduce strife by giving workers political and 
economic power.115 During the New Deal, the National Labor Relation Board was set 
up to administer over claims of unfair labor practices and interpret unfair labor 
practice and representation provisions of the Wagner Act.116 Under the Wagner Act, 
unionism increased since the Great Depression of the 1920s. The Wagner Act 
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contained no limitations on the activities of unions.117 By the late 1940s, business 
people had become worried about the expanding membership and economic power of 
the labor movement. Such fear led to the Traft-Hartley Act of 1947 and the Landrum-
Griffin Act of 1959 Amendments to the NLRA, which reduced the power of unions 
by, for example, forbidding certain union “bad practices” and regulating unions' 
internal affairs and union officials' relationships with employers.118 The statute shows 
a shift from encouraging unionization to a neutral position as well as protecting 
employees from coercion.119 
B.  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ABILITY OF THE CHINESE 
LABOR LAWS AND AMERICAN LABOR LAWS TO STATISFY WORKERS’ 
DEMANDS 
1. The Definition of Employee 
In China, the Provisions on Collective Contracts120 and the Labor Contract 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (Labor Contract Law)121 use the term 
“employee” to describe people who enjoy the right to organize and bargain 
collectively under these statutes. According to Article 20 of the Provisions on 
Collective Contract, employee representatives shall be elected by the corresponding 
trade union. In an enterprise without an employee trade union, representatives may be 
recommended by the employees in a democratic way and be approved with the 
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consent of more than 50% of the employees.122 This raises the question: who is the 
employee in the labor-management relationship? 
The employee/employer relationship is described in Article 2 Part 1 of the 
Labor Contract Law: “this law shall apply to the establishment of employment 
relationship between employees and enterprises, individual economic organizations, 
private non-enterprises, or other organizations (hereafter referred to as employers), 
and to the formation, fulfillment, change, dissolution, or termination of labor 
contracts.”123 Employees, therefore, are workers having labor relationships with 
employers. Under the laws, there is no clear definition of who is an “employee”. 
Instead of defining the “employee”, Chinese legislators use an indirect way to define 
it by defining certain employers.  Article 2 of the Labor Contract Law defines 
employers as enterprises, individual economic organizations, private non-enterprises 
entities, or other organizations.  
Another important factor in figuring out who is an employee under the law is 
the labor relationship referred to in the law. Labor relationships are governed by the 
labor contract law and are different from service relationships that are regulated by 
the civil laws. In additional to Article 2 of the Labor Contract Law, labor relationships 
appear in Article 7 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several 
Issues about the Application of Laws for the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases (II), which 
states that the following relationships are not labor relationships: “4) a dispute 
between a family or individual and a family service provider; 5) a dispute between a 
private craftsman and a helper or apprentice; and 6) a dispute over a rural contractor 
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and a person he has employed.”124 Article7 of the Interpretation (III) of the Supreme 
People’s Court of Several Issues on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor 
Dispute Cases excludes the relationship between “ an employer and an employee who 
has already enjoyed pension insurance treatments or received pensions pursuant to the 
law when he is employed by the employer”125 from the definition of the labor 
relationship but the service relationship. Article 8 of the Interpretation (III) of the 
Supreme People’s Court of Several Issues on the Application of Law in the Trial of 
Labor Dispute Cases takes the relationships as labor relationship when “a employees 
of an new employer, but the employee who is on leave with pay suspension, has 
retired under the statutory age of retirement, is removed from post or waiting for a 
post or is on a long leave due to the former enterprise's operational cessation of 
production with the former employer” 126 instead this is a service relationship. 
According to the definitions of employer and labor relationships, an employee shall 
include employees working and having labor relationships with enterprises, individual 
economic organization entities, or other organizations, and shall not include a family 
service provider, a helper of private craftsman or apprentice, and a person employed 
by a rural contractor. Aside from these three exclusions, the definition of the 
employee is still obscure under the law. 
In contrast, the definition of the employee in the United States is more explicit 
and detailed in the law. Section 2(3) of the NLRA states:  
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“The definition of employee shall include any employee, and 
shall not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless 
the Act explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual 
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with, any 
current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who 
has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent 
employment, but shall not include any individual employed as an 
agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person 
at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or spouse, or 
any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any 
individual employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an 
employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to 
time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein 
defined.”127 
  
Although the NLRA's definition of employee includes "any employee," it also 
expressly lists the exceptions: independent contractors128, supervisors129, and 
employees covered by the Railway Labor Act.130 Case law has also excluded 
managerial employees and confidential employees from the NLRA through Bell 
Aerospace Co. Division131 and Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership.132 And 
employees who were endowed with managerial status in determining the central 
policies of their employer are also excluded from the NLRA under Yeshiva (1980).133 
The court exempted certain charge nurses and defined them not as supervisors 
because of their exercise of professional, technical, or experienced judgment based on 
their professional employee status.134  
Comparing to the implementation of “employee” sections in the laws of the 
two countries, it is harder to determine the “employee” definition in labor disputes in 
China. The main reason is that in China is that the “employee” definition is derived 
                                                        
127 National Labor Relation Act, 29 U.S.C §152 (3)(2009). 
128 “Independent contractors are not covered by the NLRA, based on the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947 
overruling Hearst Publs.”, NLRB v. Hearst Publ'n, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944).  
129 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2009).  
130 45 U.S.C § 151 (2009).  
131 NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Division, 416 U.S. 267 (1974) (exempting managerial employees). 
132 NLRB v. Hendricks County Rural Electric Membership Corp., 454 U.S. 170 (1981) (exempting 
confidential employees). 
133 NLRB v. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. 672, 682 (1980). 
134 348 N.L.R.B. 686, at 694.  
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from the employees of Sated-owned enterprises model,135 which does not reflect the 
current labor market and impedes economic development. Despite this flaw, labor 
relationships are nevertheless regulated under such model, resulting in numerous 
labor disputes. 136 In particular, employees from rural areas were included for the first 
time under the Labor Contract Law of 2008. 137  However, rural employees could not 
obtain benefits from public services because they are not registered as citizens who 
obtain benefits from “City Houkou”.138 Public services, such as the Public 
Employment Service and Union Services, have begun to provide services to rural 
workers since 2003, but social insurance benefits are still hard to obtain if workers 
comes from rural areas.139  Although rural employees are real employees protected by 
the Labor Contract Law, a lack of supporting policies and a detailed definition 
encompassing their unique perspective resulted in rural employees working in poor 
conditions for a long time.140 As shown in Figure 4, the total number of rural 
employees has been decreasing since 2009, but it is still higher than the total number 
of urban employees.141 It is critical for legislators to review the definition of the 
employees, and most notably, to review rural employees to ensure that their rights are 
protected and enforced. With a greater coverage of employees, unions would have a 
better chance to organize a larger percent of employees in a certain plant and 
                                                        
135  Changzheng Zhou, Laodong Fa Zhongde Ren (劳动法中的人) [The Relevant Definition of People 
in Labor Laws], Vol.34 No.1 MOD. L. SCI. 103, 109 (2012). 
136 Id. 
137 Id. 
138 “City Hukou is a household registration record officially identifies a person as a resident of an area 
and includes identifying information such as name, parents, spouse, and date of birth. Because of its 
entrenchment of social strata, especially as between rural and urban residency status, the hukou system 




141 KNIGHT & SONG, supra note 14, at 90-91. 
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nationally as well.142 A broad definition of employee favors greater union bargaining 
power on the premise of a comprehensive collective bargaining mechanism, and vice 
versa. 
Figure 4: The urban and rural workforce in China 143 
 
As the information technology changes have occurred in production, in the 
United States, production has become more decentralized, and more skilled 
employees have greater free choice to work.144 The narrow definition of employee 
under the NLRA has excluded a larger share of the workforce.145 In addition, with 
increased international trade, national borders have showed less importance in 
collective bargaining.146 For example, Japanese workers are protected under Japanese 
labor law with broader coverage of the employee definition, so they can still can 
bargain with employers who shift production to low-wage workers overseas.147 Thus, 
broader coverage is increasingly important in the new global economy. Boarder 
coverage of employees is significant for both China and the United States.  
                                                        
142 Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt & Benjamin C. Ellis, Comparative Analysis of the United States and 
Japan, 20 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010). 
143 Employment in China, CHINA LAB. BULL. (June 22, 2013), 
http://www.clb.org.hk/en/content/employment-china. 
144 Id. at 10. 
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2. Organizing and Bargaining Rights of Employees 
In order to analyze the rights of employees, it is first helpful to know how to 
set up trade unions are set up in China. Although the official All China Federation of 
Trade Unions (ACFTU) is a “monolithic organization”,148 there is considerable 
variation within ACFTU in terms of union organizing strategies. Unions are top-down 
organizations classified into the national ACFTU, local trade union federations 
(Defang Gonghui),149 industry trade union federations (Chanye Gonghui),150 and 
grassroots trade unions (Jiceng Gonghui).151  
In the traditional official unions model, the national ACFTU sets up grassroots 
unions relying on organizing quotas by obtaining the approval of employers instead of 
mobilizing and organizing workers per se.152 Under such conditions, although this 
dominant pattern of union organizing has rapidly increased the ACFTU's membership, 
it may cause the grassroots unions to become completely dependent upon employers 
and become more or less irrelevant to Chinese workers.153 The official grassroots 
unions designated by high-level official unions provide welfare,154 and pass on 
workers demands to employers. Depending on whether workers have a good 
employer, or, these unions might rarely represent workers.155 As for unions in Stated-
owned enterprises (SOEs), the official grassroots unions are totally top-down unions 
under the direction of the national ACFTU, so employees in state sectors have been 
                                                        
148 Mingwei Liu, Union Organizing in China: Still a Monolithic Labor Movement, 64 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 30, 30 (2010-2011). 
149 “Local trade unions are established at the provincial (Shengji Gonghui), district, city, county, 
township, village and neighborhood levels, however, local trade union federations can be set up at and 
above the county level.” QIAO, supra note 113, at 13.  
150 Id. “Industrial unions are established at the national, provincial, city and township levels. Industrial 
trade union federations can be set up at and above the county level”. 
151 Id.  
152 Liu, supra note 148, at 37. 
153 Id. at 48. 
154 Unions provide welfare, such as arranging workers to have a trip or other entertainment activities. 
155 Liu, supra note 148, at 41-2. 
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thoroughly unionized with an over 90 percent labor participation rate.156 The 
establishment of unions in non-stated-owned enterprises is more or less harder 
depending on the employer in the traditional model. In this chapter, I discuss the 
establishment of grassroots unions in non-stated-owned enterprises. Even though the 
Trade Union Law says that neither an employer nor any party could prohibit union 
organization, employers in non-state-owned enterprises might have a negative attitude 
towards organizing preventing high-level unions from setting up units in these 
companies. Quanzhou Difang Gonghui157 (Quanzhou local union), however, has tried 
a novel way to get developing workers becoming union members to have a union 
committee in order to organize units at Walmart without depending on the 
enterprise’s human resource department to set up a pre-union group (Gonghui 
Choubei group)158 and instead of a totally top-down unions designed by the higher 
level official union. The President in the Quanzhou local union is like a union 
organizer in the process of organizing a unit. It took 10 years to establish the union at 
Walmart, which was finally set up in 2006.159 However, after the union was set up at 
Walmart, and even though workers joining in the unit have increased to 500 
members,160 there are still large numbers of workers who are afraid to become 
members of the union because the lack of protections in the law allow employers to 
                                                        
156 Xiaohui Wang (王晓慧), Guoqi Gonghui Zhineng De Bianqian Yanjiu (国企工会职能的变迁研究) 
[The Function of the Union in State-owned Enterprises], Vol.13 No. 6 Guangdong Gongye Daxue 
Xuebao (广东工业大学学报) 52, 52-3; Guo, supra note 104, at 1-2. 
157 Quanzhou is the largest city of Fujian Province, People's Republic of China. All enterprises in 
Quanzhou establish their own unions, including Foreign-owned Enterprises. 
158 A pre-union group is a group that helps establishing grassroots unions. 
159 Wal-Mart Zhongguo Gonghui Shinian (沃尔玛中国工会十年破茧 能否顺利成长仍待观察) 
[Chinese Unions in Walmart], Xinjing Bao (新京报) [XINJING NEWS] (Aug. 15, 2006), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-08/15/content_4964319.htm. 
160 Deming Xu: Wal-Mart Jian Gonghui Qianhou (徐德明：沃尔玛建工会前后) [Deming Xu: Before 
and After Wal-Mart set up the Union], Xinhua Wang (新华网) [XINHUA INTERNET] (Oct. 14, 2006), 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/video/2006-10/14/content_5204856.htm. 
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continue unfair labor practice.161 Because of the insufficiency of the laws, it is hard to 
implement collective bargaining in reality, and workers’ demands are hard to satisfy.  
Although reforms in the Trade Union Law (2001), which forbids supervisors 
or managers from joining grassroots unions, resulted in greater independence, there 
are still some problems in the Trade Union Law making it hard to apply in practice. 
Article 10 of the Trade Union Law says that the trade union of an enterprise with 
more than 25 members shall establish a grassroots trade union committee; if there are 
less than 25 members, a grassroots trade union committee may be established 
separately, or a grassroots trade union committee may be set up jointly by members of 
two units or more; or an organizer may be elected to organize various activities for 
members.162 And Article 11 says that high-level unions could assist and direct 
workers to set up a union, and any firms should not prohibit workers from doing so.163 
In Article 51164 and 52,165 it only states that employers should not prohibit workers 
                                                        
161 Wal-Mart Heyi Gai Guanli Yingzi Gonghui Nengzou Douyuan? (沃尔玛何以改惯例 影子工会能
走多远?) [Why does Wal-Mart Agree to set up the Union in China?], Xinhua Wang (新华网) 
[XINHUA INTERNET] (Aug. 24, 2006), http://news.xinhuanet.com/employment/2006-
08/24/content_5000288.htm. 
162 “The trade union of an enterprise, public institution or government organ with 25 or more members 
shall establish a basic-level trade union committee; if the members are less than 25, a basic-level trade 
union committee may be established separately, or a basic-level trade union committee can be 
established by the members of 2 units or more, or an organizer may be elected to organize activities for 
the members. If the number of female employees is relatively large, a trade union committee for female 
employees may be established under the leadership of the equivalent level trade union; if the number of 
female employees is relatively small, female employee members shall be included in the trade union 
committee…Several enterprises of the same industry or in industries of a similar nature may establish a 
national or local specific industry trade union, depending on their requirements.” Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Gonghui Fa (中华人民共和国工会法) [The Trade Union Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm.Nat’l People’s Cong., Oct. 27, 2001, effective Oct. 27, 2001), art.10 (Lawinfochina) 
(China). 
163 “The establishment of a basic-level trade union, local all-level federation of trade unions or a 
national or local specific industry trade union must be reported to the trade union organization at the 
next highest level for approval. The trade unions at the higher level may assign personnel to assist and 
guide the workers and staff members of enterprises to establish trade unions, no unit or individuals may 
obstruct the effort.” Id. art.11. 
164 “Those in violation of the provisions of this Law, that make vindictive attacks by transferring the 
working personnel of trade unions performing their duties according to law from their posts without 
justified reasons shall be ordered by the administrative department of labor to make corrections; and 
shall make compensation if any loss is caused. Those that insult, defame or make personal injuries to 
the trade union working personnel performing duties according to law and thus committed crimes shall 
be investigated for criminal responsibilities; if the case is not serious enough to constitute a crime, the 
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from establishing a union, but it does not provide enough remedies if employers break 
the laws, such as the “reasonable reasons” stated in the law are unclear and lack of 
certain redress to workers who are interfered with by employers when organizing 
movements or protecting rights activities. Moreover, the members referred to in 
Article 10 are confused because before setting up the grassroots union how do the 
workers become members of the union? Nevertheless, in practice, there are two 
approaches to set up a trade union.  
First, relying on the human resources department of a company, the company 
can set up a pre-union group (Gonghui Choubei group) to discuss with workers 
whether to set up a union or not. If they all agree to do so, the next step is getting 
members to register. The third step is to unite these members to set up a union 
committee and then hold a conference to conduct a democratic vote for selecting the 
president, vice president, and committee members. The last step is to get approval 
from the high-level union and authorized leaders in the union. Second, if the 
company’s human resources department does not initiate the establishment of a pre-
union group, the president or other leaders in a high-level trade union could persuade 
workers to be union members without depending on the enterprise level. And then 
these members should or could set up the grassroots union committee if they are more 
than 25 members or less than 25. The next step is a democratic vote among these 
members in the company to select the president, vice-president, and committee 
members. If the members in a firm are less than 25, it is easier for a firm that might 
                                                                                                                                                              
public security departments shall give punishment according to the regulations on punishment with 
respect to management of pubic security.” Id. art.51. 
165 “In any of the following cases in which the provisions of this Law are violated, the administrative 
department for labor shall order that the victim be reinstated, his remuneration payable during the 
period of the termination of the labor contract be made up, or that a compensation two times the 
amount of his annual income be given: 1) the employees’ labor contracts are cancelled because of the 
employees’ participation in trade union activities; or 2) the labor contracts of the trade union working 
personnel are cancelled because of their performance of the duties provided for by this Law”, Id. art.52. 
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hold a negative attitude to neither respond to setting up the union committee nor 
prohibit the set up of one. The last step to organizing the grassroots union is 
authorizing the union leaders to the high-level union and getting an approval from the 
high-level union. In the grassroots union pattern, it is easier for employers to control 
the process of organizing grassroots union in most conditions and they play a major 
role in shaping the outcomes for industrial relations, therefore, more details and 
explanations in the laws should be given.166 Since some industrial workplaces have 
suffered from shortages of workers, however, workers having skills in high demand 
might gain bargaining power and force the official grassroots union to genuinely 
represent the workers some day in the future.167 
Besides the traditional ACFTU and its grassroots unions’ system, there are 
two types of new systems: the Gonghui Lianhehui (one of the Union Association 
Patterns)168 and the Hangye Gonghui (one of the unions associations)169. The 
traditional grassroots union occurs in most conditions in both SOEs and non-State-
owned enterprises, while the Gonghui Lianhehui and the Hangye Gonghui mostly 
organize their movement in small non-State-owned enterprises, such as small POEs 
(Private-owned Enterprises), FIEs (Foreign-invested Enterprises), and IOBs 
(Individually-owned Business). Compared with the traditional trade union, in these 
new systems the employers only play a limited role in shaping the union organizing 
because they do not have any effective means of preventing or controlling unions 
                                                        
166 Liu, supra note 148, at 49. 
167 Id. at 48. 
168 Since the late 1990s, in areas with high concentrations of small enterprises or individually owned 
businesses (IOBs, getihu),"regional unions have begun to organize union associations (Gonghui 
Lianhehui) to cover multiple workplaces, such as community unions (Shequ Gonghui), village union 
associations (Cun Gonghui Lianhehui), market unions (Shichang Gonghui), office building unions 
(Bangonglou Gonghui), and union associations of FIEs or POEs (Waiqi or Siqi Gonghui Lianhehui).” 
Liu, supra note 148, at 42. 
169 Regional unions that follow the regional, industry-based bargaining pattern choose to organize 
union associations by trade and engage in regional, industry-based negotiations of wages and other 
employment conditions. See Liu, supra note 148, at 45. 
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from being established.170 In the Gonghui lianhehui, the regional unions directly set 
up union associations without the need of employer agreement, by means of direct 
leading and appointing their own staffs as union leaders, like the president. Although 
Gonghui lianhehui pattern unions are more independent from employers, they are 
highly dependent on regional unions and further on the state administration, which 
might make concessions to firms in order to give top priority to economy growth.171 
In the Hangye Gonghui system, with the help of the government and high-level union, 
the regional trade union council decides to organize union associations by trade. In 
order to reverse the shortage of workers in small POEs, the Hangye Gonghui has been 
established for certain purposes to collectively negotiate wages and other issues 
related to working conditions, which makes this kind of union more representative.172 
It is able to transform the administrative union power of the government into 
bargaining power under certain conditions.173 Although this form of unions is not 
common, the Labor Contract Law (2008) Article 53174 recognizes regional collective 
bargaining contracts and industry-based collective contracts, which may facilitate this 
kind of union.175  
In conclusion, the unions in China are not completely independent, which is 
hard to change due to complicated conditions, but Chinese legislators could try to 
figure out a more efficient approach to satisfy workers’ demands by establishing the 
real trade unions. Article 2 and 3 of the Trade Union Law in China ensure the 
                                                        
170 Liu, supra note 148, at 49. 
171 Id. at 42-44. 
172 FROM IRON RICE BOWL TO INFORMALIZATION: MARKETS, WORKERS, AND THE STATE IN A 
CHANING CHINA, 171 (Sarosh Kuruvilla et al. eds., 2011). 
173 Liu, supra note 148, at 46. 
174 “Industrial or regional collective contracts may be concluded between the labor unions and the 
representatives of enterprises in industries such as construction, mining, catering services, etc. in the 
regional at or below the county level.” Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa (中华人民
共和国劳动合同法) [Labor Contract Law of the People’s Republic of China (2012 Amendment)], 
supra note 121, art.53. 
175 Liu, supra note 148, at 49. 
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employees’ right to join or form a union shall not be restricted and that any party shall 
not refrain employees from joining the union.176 Article 7 of the Provisions on 
Collective Contracts (1995)177 provides the definition of collective bargaining: the 
union or representatives of employees bargain with the representative of an employer 
to reach a collective agreement.178 The definition of collective bargaining is not in the 
Provisions on Collective Contracts (2004). In March 2015, the administrative 
department of labor issued “the draft of Provisions on Collective Contracts and Labor 
Contract Law” adding terminology and explanations into laws, such as collective 
bargaining, collective contract, and representative of collective negotiation.179  
Compared to China, obstructions confronted by the United States during the 
organization of unions are dealt with differently under the National Labor Relations 
Act and the Railway Labor Act, which have changed this aspect of the labor and 
management relationship.180 The National Labor Board authorized by the NLRA 
determines employees’ choice of a collective bargaining unit.181 In the NLRA, 
Section 7 guarantees the rights of employees to join, form, and assist in organizing 
their own organizations, and to bargain collectively through representatives of their 
own organization.182 If such rights are affected by an agreement requiring 
                                                        
176 “Trade unions are mass organizations formed by the working classes of their own free will. . . . 
[Workers] shall have the right to participate in and form trade union organizations pursuant to the 
law…no organization or individual may hinder them from doing so or restrict them.” Zhonghua 
Renmin Gongheguo Gonghui Fa (中华人民共和国工会法) [The Trade Union Law], supra note 162, 
art.2, 3. 
177 Jiti Hetong Guiding (集体合同规定) [Provision on Collective Contracts] (promulgated by the 
Ministry of Labor and Social Security(dissolved), Dec. 15, 1994, non-effective), art.7 (Lawinfochina) 
(China). 
178 Id. art.7. 
179 Guanyu Zhengqiu Laodong Hetong Guifan Deng Sanxiang Gongjia Biaozhun Yijian De Han (关于
征求《劳动合同规范》等 3项国家标准意见的函) [The National Standard Letter on Opinions of 
Labor Contracts], ADMIN. DEP’T LAB. (Feb. 27, 2015), 
http://www.mohrss.gov.cn/SYrlzyhshbzb/zxhd/SYzhengqiuyijian/201502/t20150227_152665.htm. 
180 James L. Jr. Hall & H. Leonard Court, Selecting a Union Representative: Management's Role, 26 
OKLA. L. REV. 38, 38 (1973); 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970); Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. 
(1970). 
181 29 U.S.C. § 159; 45 U.S.C. § 152; Hall & Court, supra note 180, at 39. 
182 29 U.S.C. § 158. 
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membership as a condition of employment, employees shall not have the right to 
refrain from such activities.183 Section 8 (a)’s184 “unfair labor practice” basically 
involves interference with the rights granted to employees under Section 7. Generally, 
employer’s unfair labor practices are “coercion on employees in the exercise of the 
rights in section 7; domination or interference with formation or administration of any 
labor organization; discrimination regard with hire or tenure of employment or any 
term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in 
organization; discrimination or discharge an employee who has filed charges or given 
testimony under this Act; refusal bargaining collectively with exclusive 
representatives of employees.”185 When the Board processes a charge, the board shall 
consider evidence of the employer’s misconduct as follows: employer cannot express 
or imply anything related to union organization by means of threating,186 
interrogating,187 promising188 and spying.189  
Compared to these sections, the challenge of organizing in China is the top-
down system of organizing unions, which resulted in the grassroots union relying on 
the administration of high-level union guidance or the willingness of employer’s. In 
addition, the lack of procedural rules prevents the protection of employees’ rights to 
organize unions despite the fact that Article 3 of the Trade Union Law ensures 
employees’ rights to join and form unions. Even though established unions have been 
                                                        
183 Id. 
184 29 U.S.C. § 158(a). 
185 Id. 
186 “For example, a threat could be putting out the word that the company will close or move operations 
to another state or country if the employees bring in a union.” Mary Gormandy White, TIPS to Avoid 
Unfair Labor Practices, LOVETOKNOW BLOG (JULY 18, 2014), 
http://business.lovetoknow.com/blogs/hr-matters/tips-to-avoid-unfair-labor-practices. 
187 Id., “an interrogation could occur if management representatives question employees about their 
thoughts about unions or what might have taken place at a union organizing meeting they attended”. 
For more information, see Dau-Schmidt, supra note 51,at 472. 
188 Id., “a promise could be spreading the word to employees that the company will provide some new 
type of benefit or increase compensation – but only if the employees stop trying to organize”.  
189 Id., “spying would occur if management sent its own representatives in to union organizing 
activities to find out what employees thoughts or plans for unionizing might be”. For more information, 
see Dau-Schmidt, supra note 51,at 473.  
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increased in recent years since the policy of the government has been to support 
organize unions in China, unions still fail to sufficiently satisfy workers’ basic 
subsistence demands, not mention to bargain for them. Therefore, in order to 
strengthen workers’ organizing rights, Chinese legislators, on the one hand, should 
reconsider how to motivate workers’ to organize real, useful unions, and on the other 
hand, clearly point out employer’s unfair labor practices during the process of 
organizing in order to relieve workers’ fear of joining, forming, or assisting unions.  
3. Remedies for Improper Conducts of Employers 
Because unfair labor practices might be conducted by employers, remedies are 
important for non-offending parties to require the employer to bargain with the union. 
In the United States, the main bargaining remedies for unfair labor practices of 
employers are as follows: the NLRB can set aside the election and order another one 
at the request of the union if the Board finds that the employer or the union has 
committed unfair labor practices, created confusion or fear of reprisals and thus 
interfered with the employees' freedom of choice.190  
A cease and desist order191 will be issued with the notice-posting order if the 
employer violates Section 8(a)(1) (interfering with or coercing employees), which is 
devoted to either redressing improper conduct or preventing its recurrence.192 Further, 
as violations have become more complicated and measured the usual remedies like 
reinstatement, back pay, and notice-posting orders were not enough to prevent or 
                                                        
190 Remedies for Employer Unfair Labor Practices during Union Organization Campaigns, 77 YALE 
L.J. 1574, 1574 (1967-1968); Hall & Court, supra note 180, at 60; Conduct Elections, NLRB, 
http://www.nlrb.gov/what-we-do/conduct-elections (last visited July 3, 2015). 
191 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1964). 
192 John H. Fanning, New and Novel Remedies for Unfair Labor Practices, 3 GA. L. REV. 256, 260 
(1968-1969); Hall & Court, supra note 180, at 60.  
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redress the occurrence of unfair labor practices.193 The Board may require some 
affirmative action to remedy the union when the employer violates the NLRA through 
severe conducts, such as requiring the employer to give the union a chance to present 
its views to workers at a plant during working hours.194 For instance, in Stevens,195 the 
Board required the employer to mail notices to all employees concerning the 
misconduct;196 gave the union and its representatives reasonable access to the plant 
for one year, beginning with the issuance date of the decision to its bulletin boards;197 
and required the employer to read the notifications of the intent to conduct the unfair 
labor practices to employees during work time meetings at their plants.198 The Second 
Circuit in Stevens199 approved most parts of the order, only refusing the requirements 
of names and address provided by the employer. 
A bargaining order shall be issued if the employer committed substantial 
unfair labor practices as well as if the union has achieved majority support by 
authorization cards. In Gissel,200 the Court held that a bargaining order is the remedy 
for Section 8(a)(5) violations. The Supreme Court discussed the degree of unfair labor 
practices that would result in a bargaining order. First, a bargaining order should be 
imposed without inquiring into the card authorization, if the employer committed 
“outrageous and pervasive” unfair labor practices.201 Second, in “less extraordinary” 
cases, if the employer implemented less “pervasive” unfair labor practices tending to 
undermine majority strength and impede the election processes, the Board would 
                                                        
193 157 N.L.R.B. 869, 878 (1966); Fanning, supra note 192, at 256, 261. 
194 Hall & Court, supra note 180, at 61; NLRB v. J. P. Stevens & Co., 464 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972); 
NLRB v. H. W. Elson Bottling Co., 379 F.2d 223 (6th Cir. 1967); Montgomery Ward & Co. v. NLRB, 
339 F.2d 889 (6th Cir. 1965). 
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issue a bargaining order where the union at one point had a majority, and recognizing 
the importance of employees’ free choice.202 Third, if the unfair labor practices have 
no negative impacts on the election process, a bargaining order will not be 
commanded.203 In certain refusal to bargain situations, however, a bargaining order 
might not be enough.204 The Board may order a bonus to be paid or order the 
employer to fulfill the agreement reached previously.205 
Compared to the United States, the Trade Union Law in China provides 
insufficient compensations for non-offending workers or union members. Article 50 
of the Trade Union Law says that any organization that “obstruct the employees from 
participating in or organizing trade unions according to law or that obstruct the trade 
unions at the next higher levels from assisting and giving guidance in the 
establishment of trade union shall be ordered by the administrative department of 
labor to make corrections; those refusing to make corrections shall be submitted by 
the administrative department of labor to the government at the level of county or 
above for solution; those causing serious results by the means of violence or threats 
and constituting crimes shall be investigated into for criminal responsibilities.” 206  
Article 51 says that organization that “make vindictive attacks by transferring 
the working personnel of trade unions performing their duties according to law from 
their posts without justified reasons shall be ordered by the administrative department 
of labor to make corrections; and shall make compensation if any loss is caused. 
                                                        
202 395 U.S. 575, 614 (1969). 
203 395 U.S. 575, 615 (1969). 
204 Fanning, supra note 192, at 263. 
205 Id. at 263-64. 
206 “In violation of the provisions of Article 3, Article 11 of this Law that obstruct the employees from 
participating in or organizing trade unions according to law or that obstruct the trade unions at the next 
higher levels from assisting and giving guidance in the establishment of trade unions shall be ordered 
by the administrative department of labor to make corrections; those refusing to make corrections shall 
be submitted by the administrative department of labor to the people’s governments at the level of 
county or above for handling; those causing serious results by the means of violence or threats and 
constituting crimes shall be investigated into for criminal responsibilities.” Zhonghua Renmin 
Gongheguo Gonghui Fa (中华人民共和国工会法) [The Trade Union Law], supra note 162, art.50. 
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Those that insult, defame or make personal injuries to the trade union working 
personnel performing duties according to law, and have thus committed crimes, the 
public security departments shall give punishment according to the regulations on 
punishment with respect to management of public security”.207 
Article 52 says that “the administrative department of labor, under the 
following circumstances, shall order to resume the employees’ work and reissue the 
remunerations that should be paid during the cancellation of labor contracts, or order 
to make double compensation of the annual income of the employees: 1) the 
employees’ labor contracts are cancelled because of their participation in trade union 
activities; or 2) the labor contracts of the trade union members are cancelled due to 
the performance of his duties provided by this Law”.208  
Article 53 says that any organization that “in violation of the provisions of this 
law, commits any of the following acts shall be ordered to make corrections and be 
dealt with by the people’s governments at the level of county or above according to 
law: 1) hindering the trade union organizations in organizing the employees to 
exercise the democratic rights through the employee representative assemblies or 
other forms according to law; 2) illegally cancelling or consolidating the trade union 
organizations; 3) hindering the trade unions from participating in the investigation and 
handling of the job-related accidents resulting in fatality or personal injuries of the 
employees and other infringement upon the legal rights and interests of the employees; 
and 4) refusing to make equal negotiation without justified reasons”.209 
These remedies above are partially similar to the function of a cease and desist 
order for illegal behavior and a compensation order in the United States. For example, 
transferring union members without justified reasons violates Article 51, so the 
                                                        
207 Id. art.51. 
208 Id. art.52. 
209 Id. art.54.  
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employer will be issued a corrective order by the administrative department of labor 
and shall also make compensation if any loss is caused. And Article 52 emphatically 
states that the administrative department of labor shall issue an order of correction to 
resume working, as well as reissue the remunerations that should be paid during the 
cancellation of labor contracts, if the employer discharges workers because of their 
joining and organizing union.  
The Trade Union Law seemingly guarantees workers’ rights to join and 
organize the trade union, but in reality some workers are not willing to join or 
organize a union. There are three possible reasons why some workers are not willing 
to join and organize unions: workers have better wages and good working conditions; 
workers do not think the unions can help; workers are threatened by the employer. 
According to the surveys at Walmart in Beijing, Shenzhen, and Kunming, a large 
number of temporary workers have wages lower than about 3 yuan per hour. The 
workers are not satisfied with their wages, which are below the minimum wage set by 
law.210 Despite these conditions, some workers do not want join and organize a union 
because they do not believe in the union and are afraid of threats from their employer. 
Analyzing the deficiencies of the Trade Union Law regarding remedies for 
misconducts of the employer could provide a better understanding on how to satisfy 
workers’ demands.  
Article 50, 51, and 52, separately provide remedies for improper behavior of 
the employer. These remedies are issued as corrective orders by the administrative 
department of labor. If the employer refuses to make a correction, the administrative 
department of labor will submit it to the government at the level of county or above 
                                                        
210 Gaiyou Shuilai Zujian Gonghui? (该由谁来组建工会?) [Who will Take Charge to set up the 
Union?], Vol. 53 Zhongguo Laogong Tongxun Dianzi Bao (中国劳工通讯电子报第 53期) [CHINA 
LAB. BULL. NEWSL.] (Aug. 8, 2006), http://www.clb.org.hk/schi/content/中国劳工通讯电子报第 53
期-0. 
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county. This rule greatly depends on the administrative department of labor, which 
can often ignore the administrative pressure and overlook the improper behavior of 
employers. In contrast, under the same conditions in the United States, besides the 
cease and desist order for illegal conducts, the Board may give unions access to the 
plant to present their views. Moreover, Article 52 makes it illegal for employers to 
discharge employees who join “union activities”. However, some small enterprises 
still do not set up their grassroots union. Workers in these companies have no choice 
but to self-organize while they are in bad working conditions. Self-organized workers 
bargain collectively with employers without the union, and therefore, these workers 
are easily fired because of the lacking protections of Article 52.211 Section 7 of the 
NLRA, on the other hand, guarantees employees’ rights to self-organization. If 
China’s government cannot include self-organization in the laws to satisfy workers’ 
demands, at least it should reconsider the remedies for those self-organized workers. 
Article 53 (4) also has problems that need to be reconsidered. First, how to 
define justified reasons and which institution should determine justified reasons. 
According to the Act, the government has the authorization to set the justified reasons, 
rather than the administrative department of labor or the court. In reality, the 
government’s goals are stability, economic prosperity, and harmonization; therefore, 
in order to pursue these goals, the government might be inclined to provide 
concessions at the expense of workers’ demands. Second, the “correction” in this 
subsection means not to refuse an equal negotiation. It is like a bargaining order under 
the condition that the employer does not have justified reasons. Seemingly, it has 
increased unions’ bargaining power. Under most conditions, workers submit their 
                                                        
211 For more information, see Zhuanjia Lüshi Jianyi Xiugai Gonghui Fa (专家律师建议修改《工会法》
条款) [Scholars and Lawyers Give Advice on Revising the Trade Union Law], Caixin Wang (财新网) 
[CAIXIN INTERNAT], (May. 23, 2014), http://china.caixin.com/2014-05-23/100681482.html. 
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demands to the government through the special process “shangfang” (letters and 
visits).212 The government issues a corrective order to lead a negotiation between 
labor and management. Once the employer has still refused to bargain or negotiation 
has failed, the workers have to resubmit their demands to high-level government or 
find an alternative way to pursue their demands, such as arbitration.213 During this 
process, although the union can be the subject of law according to Article 2 of 
“Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits”,214 the union is not actually in the 
process of “shangfang”. Its function is relieving conflicts as the third party during the 
process, but not to be the representative of the workers. Thus, clearly guaranteeing the 
union as a subject of law during the “shangfang” process is necessary to achieve an 
equal negotiation. Nonetheless, employers always have negative attitudes and lose 
their motivation, unless there is an immediate economic reason for negotiation. 
Therefore, workers have no choice but to strike. For example, in December 2014, 
Guangzhou Fanyulide Shoes Co.’s workers held a strike under the direction of the 
union, and the next day the employer made a negotiation with them.215  Although 
many of these workers strikes have resulted in higher wages or other benefits, these 
strikes with "Chinese characteristics" also increase the real costs of employers and 
                                                        
212 Xinfang Tiaoli (信访条例) [Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits], (promulgated by the ST. 
COUNCIL , Jan. 10, 2005, effective May 1, 2005) (Lawinfochina) (China), art. 2. “The term "complaint 
letters and visits" as mentioned in the present Regulation refers to the activities that a citizen, legal 
person or any other organization who, by way of letter, e-mail, telephone or visit, etc., reports facts, 
submits proposals or opinions, or files a complaint to the people's governments at various levels or 
working departments of the people's governments at or above the county level, which shall be dealt 
with by the relevant administrative organs according to law”. 
213  Guanzhou Fanyu Xinsheng Shiwu Zhipin Youxian Gongsi Gongren Zhi Guanzhoushi Renda 
Jianchayuan Gonganju Qingyuanshu (广州番禺新生饰物制品有限公司工人致广州市人大、检察
院和公安局请愿书), Laogong Huzhu Wang (劳工互助网) [LAB. INTERNET], (Nov. 8, 2014), 
https://www.laogonghuzhu.org/3170.html. 
214 Xinfang Tiaoli (信访条例) [Regulation on Complaint Letters and Visits], supra note 207, art. 2.  
215 Guangzhou Fanyulide Xiechang Gongren Yu Changfa Jinxing Jiti Tanpan Chenggong Zhengqu 
Duoxiang Quanli (广州番禺利得鞋厂工人与厂方进行集体谈判 成功争取多项权利) [Collective 
Negotiation between Workers and Employer in Guangzhou Fanyulide Shoes Facotory], Zhongguo 




some strike leaders are fired and sometimes in jailed.216 Therefore, reconsideration of 
these problems in Article 53 (4) of the Trade Union Law is very important.  
In the last part of Article 50 and 51, although the employer is responsible for 
his egregious improper conducts related to criminal workers’ personal injuries and 
serious results, there is no remedy for workers when it is impossible to hold a free and 
fair election. Compared to these Articles, in the United States, if the employer 
committed egregious unfair labor practices, the remedy is to issue a bargaining order 
without a need for the authorization cards by the Board. Issuing a bargaining order 
under such conditions is another important issue that should be reconsidered and 
added into the Trade Union Law. 
IV. OTHER EMPLOYMENT PROTECTIONS – ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION  
A. A REVIEW ON THE LAWS OF ARBITRATIONS IN THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 
In order to satisfy workers’ demands in an efficient way, alternative dispute 
resolutions, notably arbitration, should become another approach to relieve labor 
strife. In China, arbitrations are not clearly divided into labor and employment 
arbitration. Collective labor disputes and individual labor disputes follow the same 
process of arbitration process controlled by law. The following laws are the main 
rules regulating arbitration and its process.  
                                                        
216 Halegua, supra note 7. 
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First, regarding the process before and during the arbitration, Article 5 of the 
Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China 
(2007)217 states: 
 “If a party does not desire a consultation where a labor dispute arises, 
the parties fail to settle the dispute through consultation, or a party 
does not execute a reached settlement agreement, any party may apply 
to a mediation organization for mediation; if a party does not desire a 
mediation, the parties fail to settle the dispute through mediation, or a 
party does not execute a reached mediation agreement, any party may 
apply to a labor dispute arbitration commission for arbitration; and a 
party disagreeing to an arbitral award may bring an action in the 
people's court except as otherwise provided for by this Law.”218  
 
This article indicates that, under the law, arbitration is a compulsory 
arbitration step before the parties can litigate. The workers and employers cannot skip 
the mandatory arbitration process to litigate in court.   
In addition, Article 41 and 42 address the process of arbitration. Article 41 
states that even after one of the two parties apply for arbitration of a labor dispute, the 
two parties may reach a settlement on their own. The application for arbitration can be 
dropped while a settlement agreement is reached.219 Article 42 of this law reads: 
 “Before rendering an award, an arbitral tribunal shall conduct 
mediation. If an agreement is reached through mediation, an arbitral 
tribunal shall make a mediation record… a mediation record shall take 
effect after being signed by both parties. An arbitral tribunal shall 
timely render an arbitration award where mediation fails or one party 
                                                        
217 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa (中华人民共和国劳动争议
调解仲裁法) [Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2007, effective May 1, 2008) 
(Lawinfochina)(China). 
218 Id. art.5. “Where a labor dispute arises, if a party does not desire a consultation, the parties fail to 
settle the dispute through consultation, or a party does not execute a reached settlement agreement, any 
party may apply to a medication organization for mediation; if a party does not desire a medication, the 
parties fail to settle the dispute through medication, or a party does not execute a reached medication 
agreement, any party may apply to a labor dispute arbitration commission for arbitration; and a party 
disagreeing to an arbitral award may bring an action in the people's court except as otherwise provided 
for by this Law”. 
219 Id. art.41. “After a party applies for arbitration of a labor dispute, the two parties may reach a 
settlement on their own. Where a settlement agreement is reached, the application for arbitration may 
be dropped”. 
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goes back on the agreement reached before a mediation record is 
served.”220  
 
Regarding the mediation record, Article 11 of the Interpretation (III) of the 
Supreme People’s Court of Several Issues on the Application of Law in the Trial of 
Labor Dispute Cases states that: “Where a mediation record made by the labor and 
personnel dispute arbitration committee has taken effect, and one party goes back on 
the agreement reached and attempts to litigate, the people's court shall not accept such 
a case; or if it has accepted the case, shall make a ruling to dismiss it.”221 
During the process of arbitration, evidence rules in Article 6 of the Labor 
Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law indicate: “A party shall be responsible for 
adducing evidence to back up its claims. The employer shall provide the evidence 
related to the disputed matter where the evidence is controlled by an employer; the 
employer who fails to provide the evidence shall bear the adverse consequences.”222  
Regarding collective labor disputes, Article 7 reads: “Where a labor dispute 
involves more than ten employees and the employees have a common claim, they 
may choose one worker to represent them in the mediation, arbitration, or 
                                                        
220 Id. art.42. “Before rendering an award, an arbitral tribunal shall conduct mediation first. Where an 
agreement is reached through mediation, an arbitral tribunal shall make a mediation record. A 
mediation record shall expressly state the arbitral claims and results of agreement by the parties. A 
mediation record shall be signed by the arbitrators, on which the seal of the labor dispute arbitration 
commission shall be affixed, and served on both parties. A mediation record shall take effect after 
being signed by both parties. Where mediation fails or one party regrets before a mediation record is 
served, an arbitral tribunal shall timely render an award”. 
221 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Shiyong Falü Ruogan Wenti De 
Jieshi (III) (最高人民法院关于审理劳动争议案件适用法律若干问题的解释(三)) [Interpretation (III) 
of the Supreme People’s Court of Several Issues on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor 
Dispute Cases], supra note 125, art.11. “Where a mediation record made by the labor and personnel 
dispute arbitration committee has taken effect, and one party regrets and brings an action, the people's 
court shall not accept such a case; or if it has accepted the case, shall make a ruling to dismiss the 
action”. 
222 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa (中华人民共和国劳动争议
调解仲裁法) [Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China], supra 
note 217, art.6. “Where a labor dispute arises, a party shall be responsible for adducing evidence to 
back up its claims…where the evidence related to the disputed matter is controlled by an employer, the 
employer shall provide it; and the employer who fails to provide the evidence shall bear the adverse 
consequences”. 
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litigation.”223 Under this article, the trade unions are not representatives of employees 
involved in the mediation, labor or employment arbitration and employment 
arbitration, or litigation. A tri-party labor mechanism is responsible for resolving 
labor disputes, and is made up of employee representatives from the All China 
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), government representatives from the Ministry 
of Labor and Social Security, and employer representatives from the China Enterprise 
Confederation (CEC/CED).224 Although the tri-party labor model, adopted in the 
Article 8, 225 mimics the tripartite system of the ILO, the unions and employees’ 
organizations are affiliated with the Party and the government, which might result in 
little debate or conflict during the discussions. However, the mandate of the three-
party mechanism does not include employment and social security in the negotiation, 
and both the trade union and employer business organizations are limited to making 
suggestions without the rights of codetermination in labor standards, procedures, and 
norms.226  
In order to guarantee the justice and equity of the arbitration, the judicial 
review system of arbitration awards as well as the authoritativeness of arbitration 
awards deserve special attention. Article 47 addresses the final binding arbitration of 
labor disputes. Article 47 states: 
 “An arbitral award on any of the following labor disputes shall be 
final and take effect at the date of rendering of the award except as 
otherwise provided for by this Law: 1) a dispute over the recovery of 
labor remunerations, medical expenses for a work-related injury, 
                                                        
223 Id. art.7. “Where a labor dispute involves more than ten employees and the employees have a same 
claim, they may recommend their representatives to participate in the mediation, arbitration, or 
litigation”.  
224 Qiao & Appelbaum, supra note 114, at 4. 
225 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa (中华人民共和国劳动争议
调解仲裁法) [Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China], supra 
note 217, art.8.  “In conjunction with the trade unions and enterprise representatives, the labor 
administrative authority of the people's government at or above the county level shall establish a tri-
party labor mechanism for coordinating the labor relations, and jointly study and address major issues 
related to labor dispute”. 
226 Qiao & Appelbaum, supra note 114, at 6-7.  
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economic indemnity, or compensation, in an amount not exceeding the 
12-month local monthly minimum wage level; and 2) a dispute over 
the working hours, breaks and vacations, social insurance, etc., arising 
from the execution of state labor standards.”227  
 
Interpreting subparagraph 1 of Article 47 of the Labor Dispute Mediation and 
Arbitration Law, Article 13 of Interpretation (III) of the Supreme People’s Court of 
Several Issues on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases states 
that “if the arbitration involves several arbitral awards listed in Article 47 (1) with the 
determined amount of each of them not exceeding 12 months' local minimum 
monthly wage, it shall be held as a final binding award.”228 However, Article 48 of 
the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law states: “An employee who 
disagrees to an arbitral award as provided for in Article 47 of this Law may bring an 
action in the people's court within 15 days after receiving an arbitral award.”229 That 
is to say, the final arbitration does not apply with respect to employees, but applies to 
the employers.  
As for the employer, if he or she proves the arbitration award prescribed in 
Article 47 falls under one of the categories in Article 49, the employer “may apply for 
revocation of the arbitral award to the intermediate people's court at the place of 
                                                        
227 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa (中华人民共和国劳动争议
调解仲裁法) [Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China], supra 
note 217, art.47. “An arbitral award on any of the following labor disputes shall be final, and an arbitral 
award shall take effect at the date of rendering of the award: 1) a dispute over the recovery of labor 
remunerations, medical expenses for a work-related injury, economic indemnity, or compensation, in 
an amount not exceeding the 12-month local monthly minimum wage level; and 2) a dispute over the 
working hours, breaks and vacations, social insurance, etc., arising from the execution of state labor 
standards”. 
228 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Shiyong Falü Ruogan Wenti De 
Jieshi (III) (最高人民法院关于审理劳动争议案件适用法律若干问题的解释(三)) [Interpretation (III) 
of the Supreme People’s Court of Several Issues on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor 
Dispute Cases], supra note 125, art.13. “Where an employee requests labor remunerations, medical 
expenses for a work-related injury or economic indemnity or compensation according to subparagraph 
(1) of article 47 of the Mediation and Arbitration Law, and the arbitral award involves several of them 
with the determined amount of each of them not exceeding 12 months' local minimum monthly wage, 
it shall be dealt with as a final award”. 
229 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Zhengyi Tiaojie Zhongcai Fa (中华人民共和国劳动争议
调解仲裁法) [Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law of the People's Republic of China], supra 
note 217, art.48. “An employee, who disagrees to an arbitral award as provided for in Article 47 of this 
Law, may bring an action in the people's court within 15 days after receiving an arbitral award”. 
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residence of the labor dispute arbitration commission within 30 days after receiving 
the arbitral award.” The categories include: “1) an arbitral award is wrong in the 
application of a law or administrative regulation; 2) the labor dispute arbitration 
commission has no jurisdiction; 3) the legal procedure is violated; 4) the evidence 
used to render the arbitral award is forged; 5) the other party has concealed evidence 
that is enough to affect the rendering of a fair award; and 6) an arbitrator in arbitrating 
the case asks for or accepts bribes, practices favoritism for personal gain or renders an 
award by perverting law.”230  
In addition, Article 18 of the Interpretation (III) of the Supreme People’s 
Court of Several Issues on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases 
states: 
 “An employee applies to the people's court for enforcing a final award 
of the labor and personnel dispute arbitration committee, while his 
employer applies for revocation of the final award to the intermediate 
people's court at the place where the labor and personnel dispute 
arbitration committee is located, the court shall make a ruling to 
suspend the enforcement. If the employer withdraws its application for 
revocation of the final award or its application is dismissed, the court 
shall make a ruling to resume enforcement. If the arbitral award is 
revoked, the court shall make a ruling to terminate enforcement. If the 
employer makes a non-enforcement defense in the enforcement 
procedure on the same grounds after its application to the court for 
revocation of the arbitral award is dismissed, the people's court shall 
not support such a defense.”231  
 
                                                        
230 Id. art.49. 
231 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Shiyong Falü Ruogan Wenti De 
Jieshi (III) (最高人民法院关于审理劳动争议案件适用法律若干问题的解释(三)) [Interpretation (III) 
of the Supreme People’s Court of Several Issues on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor 
Dispute Cases], supra note 125, art.18. “Where an employee applies to the people's court for enforcing 
a final award of the labor and personnel dispute arbitration committee, and his employer applies for 
revocation of the final award to the intermediate people's court at the place where the labor and 
personnel dispute arbitration committee is located, the people's court shall make a ruling to suspend the 
enforcement…if the employer withdraws its application for revocation of the final award or its 
application is dismissed, the people's court shall make a ruling to resume enforcement. If the arbitral 
award is revoked, the people's court shall make a ruling to terminate enforcement…if, after its 
application to the people's court for revocation of the arbitral award is dismissed, the employer makes a 
non-enforcement defense in the enforcement procedure on the same grounds, the people's court shall 
not support such a defense”. 
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If an employer applies for revocation of an arbitral award to the intermediate 
people's court under Article 49 of the Mediation and Arbitration Law, according to 
Article 16 of the Interpretation (III) of the Supreme People’s Court of Several Issues 
on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases, “the ruling of the 
intermediate people's court on dismissing the application or revoking the arbitral 
award shall be final.”232 Moreover, the judicial review system of arbitral awards is 
regulated by the Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on Several Issues about 
the Application of Laws for the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases. For example, Article 21, 
it states: 
“If any party against the arbitral awards having the evidence which 
proves that the labor dispute arbitration award or mediation paper is 
under any of the following circumstances, and which is found to be 
true upon examination and verification, the people's court can decide 
not to implement the said award or mediation paper according to 
Article 217 of the Civil Litigation Law: 1) the matters do not fall into 
the labor dispute arbitration scope, or the labor dispute arbitration 
commission has no authority to decide the matters; 2) there is an error 
in the application of law; 3) the arbitrator commits an act of 
malpractice for personal benefits and perverts the law in the arbitration 
of the case; or 4) the people's court determines that the implementation 
of the labor dispute arbitration award would contradict social and 
public interests. The people's court shall, in the written ruling of not 
implementing the award, notify the parties involved of their right to 
bring a lawsuit within 30 days as of the day after the writing ruling has 
been received.”233  
                                                        
232 Id. art.16. “Where an employer applies for revocation of an arbitral award to the intermediate 
people's court according to Article 49 of the Mediation and Arbitration Law, the ruling of the 
intermediate people's court on dismissing the application or revoking the arbitral award shall be final”. 
233 “Where either party involved applies to the people's court for implementing the award or mediation 
paper that was rendered by the labor dispute arbitration commission and has taken legal effect, if the 
party against whom an application is filed produces the evidence which proves that the labor dispute 
arbitration award or mediation paper is under any of the following circumstances, and which is found 
to be true upon examination and verification, the people's court can decide not to implement the said 
award or mediation paper according to Article 217 of the Civil Litigation Law: 1) the matters decided 
exceed the labor dispute arbitration scope, or the labor dispute arbitration commission has no authority 
to decide the said matters; 2) there is an error in the application of law; 3) the arbitrator commits an act 
of malpractice for personal benefits and perverts the law in the arbitration of the case; or 4) the people's 
court determines that the implementation of the labor dispute arbitration award would contradict social 
and public interests. The people's court shall, in the written ruling of not implementing the award, 
notify the parties involved of their right to lodge a lawsuit with the people's court for the labor dispute 
within 30 days as of the day after the writing ruling has been received.” Zuigao Renmin Fayuan 
Guanyu Shenli Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Shiyong Falü Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi (最高人民法院关于
审理劳动争议案件适用法律若干问题的解释) [Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on 
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Besides Article 48 of the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, 
which illustrates the employees’ right to file a lawsuit in court, of further help in 
figuring out the under what conditions the labor dispute arbitration award could be 
litigated in court is Article 17 of the Interpretation of the Supreme People's Court on 
Several Issues about the Application of Laws for the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases,234 
which states “if either party involved is not satisfied with part of the award and lodges 
a lawsuit with the people's court after the labor dispute arbitration commission renders 
an arbitration award, the labor dispute arbitration award will take no legal effect.”235  
Regarding partial litigation of arbitration awards, Article 18 states “after the 
labor dispute arbitration commission renders an arbitration award to a labor dispute 
involving several workers, if some workers are not satisfied with the arbitration award 
and lodge a lawsuit with the people's court, the labor dispute arbitration award will 
take no legal effect on the workers that have brought the lawsuit; and take legal effect 
on the workers that have not brought the lawsuit; if these workers apply for 
implementation, the people's court shall accept their application.”236 If an arbitral 
award provided by the labor and personnel dispute arbitration committee contains 
both matters on which a final award is issued and matters with no final determinations, 
Article 14 of the Interpretation (III) of the Supreme People’s Court of Several Issues 
                                                                                                                                                              
Several Issues about the Application of Laws for the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases] (promulgated by 
the Sup. People’s Ct., Dec.16, 2008, effective Dec.31, 2008), art.21 (Lawinfochina) (China). 
234 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Laodong Zhengyi Anjian Shiyong Falü Ruogan Wenti De 
Jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理劳动争议案件适用法律若干问题的解释) [Interpretation of the 
Supreme People's Court on Several Issues about the Application of Laws for the Trial of Labor Dispute 
Cases], Id., art.17. 
235 Id. art.17. “After the labor dispute arbitration commission renders an arbitration award, if either 
party involved is not satisfied with part of the award and lodges a lawsuit with the people's court, the 
labor dispute arbitration award will take no legal effect”. 
236 Id. art.18. “After the labor dispute arbitration commission renders an arbitration award to a labor 
dispute involving several workers, if some workers are not satisfied with the arbitration award and 
lodge a lawsuit with the people's court, the labor dispute arbitration award will take no legal effect on 
the workers that have lodged the lawsuit; and take legal effect on the workers that have not lodged the 
lawsuit; if these workers apply for implementation, the people's court shall accept their application”.  
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on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases states  “a party may 
bring an action in the people's court against such arbitral awards.”237  
If an employee brings an action in the basic people's court according to Article 
48 of the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law at the same time that his 
employer applies for revocation of an arbitral award to the intermediate people's court 
at the place where the labor and personnel dispute arbitration committee is located 
according to Article 49 of the Mediation and Arbitration Law, according to Article 15, 
“the intermediate people's court shall not accept such an application; or if it has 
accepted it, shall make a ruling to dismiss the application.” 238  If the people's court 
dismisses the lawsuit or the employee withdraws the lawsuit, however, “the employer 
may, within thirty days after receiving the court ruling, apply to the intermediate 
people's court at the place where the labor and personnel dispute arbitration 
committee is located for revocation of the arbitral award.”239  
The party involved in a labor dispute can directly brings a lawsuit under 
Article 12 of the Interpretation (III) of the Supreme People’s Court of Several Issues 
on the Application of Law in the Trial of Labor Dispute Cases, if the arbitration 
committee fails to make a decision on acceptance of a case or render an arbitral award 
within the prescribed time limit. However, there are additional limitations; the party 
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238 Id. art. 15(1). “Where an employee brings an action in the basic people's court according to Article 
48 of the Mediation and Arbitration Law, and his employer applies for revocation of an arbitral award 
to the intermediate people's court at the place where the labor and personnel dispute arbitration 
committee is located according to Article 49 of the Mediation and Arbitration Law, the intermediate 
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239 Id. art. 15(2). “If the people's court dismisses the action or the employee withdraws the action, the 
employer may, within thirty days after receiving the court ruling, apply to the intermediate people's 
court at the place where the labor and personnel dispute arbitration committee is located for revocation 
of the arbitral award”. 
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involved cannot directly bring a lawsuit to the court when “any of the following 
situations apply to the pending arbitration: 1) the case is transferred to another 
arbitration committee having jurisdiction; 2) the service is being made or there is any 
delay in service of process; 3) the committee is waiting for the result of another 
lawsuit or a disability appraisal conclusion; 4) the party concerned is waiting for a 
hearing by the labor and personnel dispute arbitration committee; 5) the 
authentication procedure is started or another department is authorized to investigate 
and take evidence; or 6) there is any other legitimate cause.”240 
Unlike the arbitration in China, arbitrations in the United States are classified 
into labor arbitrations and employment arbitrations. A labor arbitration is the 
arbitration of a dispute between an employer and the union representatives of 
employees. There are two types of labor disputes in the arbitrations: grievance 
disputes and interest disputes. Grievance disputes occur in the application of the 
meaning or terms already contained in collective bargaining agreements, while 
interest dispute arbitrations provide a method for resolving disputes about the terms to 
be included in a new collective bargaining agreement. Because public sector 
employees have no right to strike, the interest arbitration is most frequently used to 
reach a new agreement. If there is already a collective bargaining agreement, it may 
include a grievance arbitration clause for the settlement of grievances relating to a 
                                                        
240 Id. art. 12. “Where the labor and personnel dispute arbitration committee fails to make a decision on 
acceptance of a case or render an arbitral award within the prescribed time limit, and the party 
concerned directly brings an action, the people's court shall accept such a case, except that there is any 
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violation of the agreement in front of a neutral third party. In the United States, 
because grievance dispute arbitrations make up the majority of labor arbitrations as 
opposed to interest dispute arbitrations, unless otherwise stated, the discussion of 
labor arbitration in this chapter concerns grievance arbitrations.  
The following precedents guaranteed the authoritativeness of grievance 
arbitration and the court’s function with respect to the arbitral awards. First, in 
Lincoln Mills,241 the court held that even if under section 301(a)242 of the Labor 
Management Relations Act of 1947 states that parties involved in the breach of an 
agreement may bring suit it any district court of the United States having jurisdiction 
over the parties, congressional policy favors the enforcement of agreements through 
grievance arbitration.243 Courts’ judicial review function in ensuring the awards from 
grievance dispute arbitrations was discussed in the following cases. American 
Manufacturing244 emphasized that the function of the court is very limited when the 
parties have agreed to submit to the arbitrator related interpretations of all questions in 
the contract.245 The courts have no authority to weigh the merits of a grievance when 
the parties agree to submit all grievances to arbitration.246 Therefore, when the 
interpretation and application of an existing collective bargaining agreement is at 
issue, arbitration should be ordered, otherwise, the judiciary usurps a function that has 
been assigned to the arbitration tribunal.247 Steelworkers’ Trilogy248 held that the court 
has no final say on the merits of the awards arbitrated under the collective bargaining 
                                                        
241 Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
242 29 USC § 185(a): “venue, amount, and citizenship. Suits for violation of contracts between an 
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246 Id. at 568. 
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agreements.249 The courts have no business overruling the arbitral award, which is 
legitimate so long as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement.250 
The court, on the other hand, has no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award if 
the arbitrator's words demonstrate a failure to meet this obligation.251 According to 
Court in Warrior and Gulf, 252 Congress, under section 185(a) of the Labor 
Management Relations Act (LMRA),253 entrusted to the courts’ duty of determining 
whether a reluctant party has breached his promise to arbitrate. The judicial inquiry 
conducted by the court under section 185(a) of the LMRA must be strictly limited to 
the question of whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the grievance or did 
agree to give the arbitrator power to make the award.254 The Court also held that the 
question of arbitrability is for the courts to decide when there are differences 
regarding the interpretation and application of a collective bargaining contract's 
provision for arbitration.255  
The arbitration hearing may be an informal conference instead of a judicial 
trial. Harvey Aluminum Inc.256 indicates that because the rules of evidence applied in 
court proceedings do not apply in arbitration hearings, all relevant evidence may be 
freely admitted so long as the hearing is fairly conducted. That is to say, the parties 
may offer evidence as they desire and such additional evidence will be provided, 
while the arbitrator may deem necessary to aid in the understanding and 
determination of the dispute.257 An unfair arbitration hearing will be considered in 
violation of 9 U.S.C.S.§ 10(c), if the arbitrator refuses to hear and consider pertinent 
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255 Id. at 583.  
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and material evidence.258 Moreover, obvious errors in the facts or interpretation of the 
law is not a cause for reversing the arbitral award if there has not been a refusal to 
hear pertinent and material evidence and the hearing has been fair.259  
The Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver260 held that the arbitration’s resolution 
of the contractual rights under the collective bargaining agreement, which did not 
expressly cover statutory claims and limited the arbitrator's authority to resolve 
contractual rights under the agreement, did not preclude a party’s rights under Title 
VII to bring a claim into court.261 Also, according to Misco, Inc.,262 as to the 
enforcement of an arbitral award under a collective bargaining agreement, a court 
may not enforce it if it would be contrary to public policy.263 The public policy should 
be explicitly well defined and significant, and is to be ascertained by the laws and 
legal precedents, and not from general considerations of supposed public interests.264 
Public policy based only on general considerations of supposed public interests, thus, 
cannot make a court set aside an arbitration award.265  
Moving beyond labor arbitrations, due to the decline of unionization, fewer 
employees are covered by the strong grievance procedures under collective 
bargaining agreements. To remedy the reduced access to justice in the workplace,266 a 
new model of arbitration known as employment arbitration emerged. In this model, it 
is much easier for employers to be repeat players in multiple arbitration cases, which 
results in a lower win-rate for employees and lower damage awards compared to 
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outcomes obtained from labor arbitration or litigation.267 Especially in the case where 
an employee is self-represented, the win-rate is lower than if the employee is 
represented by the counsel, not to mention the damage award from such a case.268 To 
some degree, compared to employment arbitration initiated by an individual employee, 
labor arbitration should be the main arbitration method to ensure win-rates and 
outcomes. Thus, Chinese legislators would benefit from reconsidering how to set up 
and develop a collective labor arbitration system in the first place to relieve increasing 
labor conflicts.  
B. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND POSSIBLE RESOULTION OF THE 
CHALLENGES FACING CURRENT LABOR ARBITRATION IN THE PEOPLE’S 
REPUBLIC OF CHINA USING THE UNITED STATES ARBITRATION MODELS  
With the increase in labor disputes in China a number of challenges have 
arisen. Unions do not play an important role, but instead act as assistants in the 
arbitration process. Workers act mostly as individual persons taking part in 
arbitrations even if they have collective labor disputes with the employer. There are 
major problems with China’s arbitration process.  
First, individual workers and representatives of workers bring a labor dispute 
to the arbitration committee instead of a union representing employees. In particular, 
with respect to collective labor disputes, even if the Labor Contract Law authorizes 
the trade union’s legal status in the performance of arbitration, there is insufficient 
supportive regulations or policies enacted in favor of the trade unions’ representation 
of workers. According to Article 56 of the Labor Contract Law and Article 49 of the 
Provisions on Collective Contracts, if a dispute occurring during the performance of a 
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collective contract is not resolved after negotiations, the labor union may apply for 
arbitration or lodge a lawsuit in pursuance of the law.269 Regarding disputes arising in 
the course of a collective negotiation, either party shall not apply for arbitration, but 
rather may file a written application to the administrative department of labor and 
social security for mediation. 
Generally, collective labor disputes in China are also classified into labor 
disputes in the performance of collective contract (grievance disputes) and labor 
disputes arising in the course of collective negotiation (interest disputes). Contrary to 
the United States, interest labor disputes in China cannot be brought before the labor 
arbitration committee. Unions, acting mostly as an assistant even in grievance 
arbitration, help employees protect their rights by requiring employers that infringe on 
workers’ labor rights and interest to bear the ability in the collective contract.270 
Given the increase of collective labor disputes in China, the question is how to 
guarantee workers’ arbitral rights in collective labor disputes and are unions acting as 
representatives for employees in labor disputes arbitration more efficient than 
individual workers applying for arbitration.  
As for the first question, compared to the United States, interest labor disputes 
cannot be arbitrated because China’s legislators and government believe that the 
administrative department of labor can resolve this kind of labor disputes more 
efficiently. If any party disagrees with the resolution of the administrative department 
                                                        
269 Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Laodong Hetong Fa (中华人民共和国劳动合同法) [Labor Contract 
Law of the People’s Republic of China (2012 Amendment)], supra note 121, art.56. “If an employer's 
breach of the collective contract infringes upon the labor rights and interests of the employees, the 
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270 Id. art.78. “A labor union shall protect the employees' legitimate rights and interests and supervise 
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law or regulation or breaches any labor contract or collective contract, the labor union may put forward 
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of labor, however, the next step of commencing an administrative suit against the 
administrative department of labor is even harder for both employees and 
employers.271 Relying on the administrative power to solve interest disputes, therefore, 
does not improve the efficiency of the process. It is also hard to say whether allowing 
interest disputes to be arbitrated is more efficient for the long term relief of labor 
disputes arising in the course of collective negotiation because those interests in 
future collective contracts are more likely based on negotiations or concessions under 
the pressure of economic weapons.  
Compared to China, grievance arbitration is the large majority of labor 
disputes in the United States; interest arbitration is mainly used in the public sector 
because public employees have no right to strikes.272 Once collective bargaining 
negotiations have reached an impasse, employers or unions can use economic 
weapons, like strikes or a lockout, to put on the pressure. With respect to public 
employees, therefore, interest arbitration could be an efficient way to resolve labor 
disputes in reaching a new collective agreement. Thus, at least for now, it is useful to 
satisfy workers’ demands in the course of contracting because employees can hardly 
put pressure on employers by using economic weapons. Although workers’ arbitral 
rights are guaranteed by law, because grievance arbitration is a necessary step in 
grievance disputes, this kind of mandatory arbitration also induces other problems, 
such as increasing the burden on labor arbitration committees, which will be 
discussed in the next paragraph. As for the second question, unions acting as 
representatives for employees in labor disputes arbitration is more efficient than 
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selecting representatives of those workers who are involved in the same labor dispute 
because union representatives have more experience and practice skills in this field.  
Second, the arbitration of all grievance labor disputes is gathered to the 
particular jurisdictional labor arbitration committee, which means arbitration is a 
required before litigation in court. Under such conditions, more labor disputes have 
piled up in arbitration committees in several places, and end up exceeding the time 
limit of labor arbitration. The most common disputes at issue are usually rights 
disputes where workers are asking for basic rights to maintain their living, such as 
wages and compensation for breaking the contract. If workers cannot obtain their 
wages or compensation as soon as possible, it will significantly threaten the well 
being of their families.  
In order to ensure the efficiency of arbitration, there is an opinion help by a 
majority of scholars in China – arbitration or litigation. “Arbitration or litigation” 
means any party in a labor dispute can select whether to use arbitration or litigation as 
the method to resolve their dispute, and once the party chooses the arbitration, the 
award will be the final binding arbitral award, and vice versa.273 This opinion seems 
capable of solving the problem, but there are still some challenges with respect to the 
nature of arbitration and equality of justice. According to the records, the rate of 
bringing a lawsuit into court after the arbitral award has increased over the years. By 
2010, the rate of litigation was up to 58.38%,274 which indicates that the arbitral 
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awards in most cases did not satisfy workers’ demands. Under arbitration or litigation, 
if any party chooses arbitration as the final binding award, it prevents them from 
lodging a lawsuit.  
Similar to grievance arbitration in the United States, a great number of 
collective bargaining agreements specifically indicate that the decision of an arbitrator 
shall be final and binding.275 Vacating the arbitral award by the courts is very limited. 
The court will not litigate the merits of an arbitral award, even if there are errors of 
facts and law in the arbitral award they are not regarded as sufficient reasons for 
dismissing the award.276 The court can vacate the arbitral award if the arbitrators 
exceed their authority or the arbitral award is contrary to ascertained public policy by 
reference to the laws and legal precedents.277 This “final binding arbitral award” 
mechanism presupposed the function of unions, the freedom of choosing arbitration, 
and believing in arbitrators’ professional competence. As for current China, with 
respect to increasingly severe labor conflicts and the imbalance of power between 
labor and management, the “arbitration or litigation” model cannot be adopted 
without first reconsidering the defects in the mechanism of labor arbitration.  
Further, if any party selects arbitration as the final binding arbitration, 
outcome awards obtained from the arbitration are less than the outcome awards from 
                                                                                                                                                              
Empirical Report of Labor Disputes in Courts around China], Yanduan Falü Zaixian (端岩法律在线), 
http://www.flzx.com/lawyer/dylaw/blog/209620.html (last visited Apr. 25, 2015).  
275 A Practical Guide for Grievance Arbitration, 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/basics_papers/nlra/grievance_arbitratio
n.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited Apr. 25, 2015). 
276 Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel＆ Car. Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596 (1960); Harris v. 
Havenar, 169 Cal. App. 2d 531, 534-35 (1959). 
277 W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, Int'l Union of United Rubber, 461 U.S. 757, 764-65 (1983); 
United Paperworkers International Union, v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 31, 44 (1987). 
67 
the court.278 Given that the awards in labor disputes are mostly for wages and 
compensation, a final arbitration that dose not satisfy workers’ basic demands related 
to living would negatively affect their families and even result in instability in society. 
Although applying the “arbitration or litigation” model might relieve the burden of 
the arbitration committee by distributing some labor disputes directed into the courts, 
it could not radically resolve the heavy burden of the arbitration committee.  
On the one hand, employees may still choose arbitration since it does not 
charge either party in labor disputes.279 On the other hand, employees and employers 
can only choose to arbitrate or litigate; they cannot select where to arbitrate because 
arbitration is authorized by jurisdiction according to Article 21 of the Labor Dispute 
Mediation and Arbitration Law.280 Even if workers or employers can select litigation 
instead of arbitration, regions with labor-intensive industries will still create much 
more labor disputes in arbitration than other places without the free right to select 
where to arbitrate among the nearest arbitration committees. It is more efficient for 
any party in a labor disputes to select the arbitration location by choice instead of 
being assigned one according to the authorized jurisdiction of the arbiter. Like in the 
United States where the American Arbitration Association keeps lists of qualified 
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arbitrators by location,281 if there is a grievance arbitration clause in collective 
bargaining agreement, labor disputes over the implementation and interpretation of 
collective bargaining contracts have to be brought to the arbitrators selected by both 
parties in the agreement. Additionally, the efficient way for ensuring workers’ right to 
organize in the previous chapter can also relieve the burden of arbitration because 
workers could fully perform collective negotiation before the arbitration.  
Third, regarding judicial review, the main goal of ensuring the 
authoritativeness of grievance arbitration is the limited judicial review of the arbitral 
awards and arbitrators’ professional qualities. In China, the authoritativeness of 
grievance arbitration is set under the law, as the final binding award in two kinds of 
conditions282 and as the compulsory arbitration. Despite the two types of final binding 
awards listed in the law, employees can still lodge a lawsuit to the court if they do not 
satisfy with these final binging awards. The authoritativeness of grievance arbitration, 
therefore, is ambiguous: on the one hand, it is ensured by Article 47 of the Labor 
Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, on the other hand, it allows employees to 
litigate in court.  
Moreover, any party involved in a labor dispute cannot choose the arbitrators 
in the arbitration committee, which are instead assigned by their jurisdiction, and 
which might be the reason for the high rate of further litigation. In fact, the win-rate 
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of arbitration is actually over 80% of all cases,283 but the outcomes of arbitral awards 
are lower than those in litigation resulting in a high rate of litigation. Such a high rate 
of litigation results from arbitrators’ chronic decision to compromise and meet 
halfway on workers’ demands and the arbitrators’ nonprofessional practice. It is true 
that selecting arbitrators through negotiation by the union and employer may also 
cause the problems. If a party clearly knows about an arbitrator’s attitude towards 
similar labor disputes, such party can get more benefits from the arbitration than from 
negotiation.284 The solution to this problem is that some states in the United States 
offer “final-offer arbitration”. The “final-offer arbitration” averts the tendency to 
make concessions halfway between employer and the employee demands, and makes 
the arbitrator selects the position of either the employer or the union.285 Thus, such 
action, can balance the imperfect information between labor and management, and 
can encourage the process of collective negotiation.  
In order to ensure the authoritativeness of grievance arbitration, China’s 
legislators should consider enacting laws and policies authorizing labor and 
management to choose their own arbitrators whom they trust instead of just limiting 
any party’s rights of litigation, which also relies on at least the condition of a 
development of due process of negotiation between the union and employer. As for 
                                                        
283 Tianjingshi Laodong Zhongcai Chenggonglü Gao Laodongzhe Shengsu Chao Jiucheng (天津市劳
动仲裁成功率高 劳动者胜诉超九成) [Employees’ Arbitral Wining-rate is Higher up to Ninety 
Percent in the Labor Arbitration Committee of Tianjing Province], Tianjing Doushi Xinwen (天津都
市新闻) [TIANJING NEWSL.] (Dec. 1, 2009), 
http://news.enorth.com.cn/system/2009/12/01/004299081.shtml; Shanghai Weiquan Huanjing 
Yuelaiyuehao Laodongzhe Zhongcai Shengshulü Da Baifenzhi Bashiliu (上海维权环境越来越好劳动
者仲裁胜诉率达 86%) [The Labor Arbitration Committee in Shanghai Province Protecting Workers’ 
Rights and Workers’ Arbitral Wining-rate is up to Eighty-six percent], Dongfang Wang (东方网) 
[DONGFANG INTERNET] (Jan. 20, 2015), http://news.sina.com.cn/e/2005-01-20/04074888006s.shtml; 
Haikoushi Zhongcaiwei Laodonzhe Shengsulü Da Baifenzhi Jiushi (劳动者胜诉率达 90% 海口市仲
裁委) [Workers’ Arbitral Wining-rate is up to Ninety percent in the Labor Arbitration Committee of 
Haikou], Haikou Wanbao (海口晚报) [HAIKOU NEWSL.] (Dec. 4, 2003), 
http://www.hainan.news.cn/news/2003-12/14/content_1339649.htm. 
284 Xudong Huang (黄旭东), supra note 271, at 220. 
285 West Des Moines Education Asso. v. Public Employment Relations Board, 266 N.W.2d 118, 119 
(Iowa 1978). 
70 
arbitrators, in some areas, some of them are nonprofessional and are not experienced 
in the process of arbitration even if Article 20286 of the Labor Dispute Mediation and 
Arbitration Law enumerates the requirements for selecting arbitrators.287  
Judicial review in China is significant in order to ensure equality of justice in 
arbitration. In Article 49 of the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration Law, an 
arbitral award may be examined by the court where the employer has evidence to 
prove the arbitral award violates the laws provided in such article, which involve both 
matters of legal procedure and matters of substantive law.288 After the arbitral award 
has taken legal effect, any party against the award can provide evidence to the court to 
make a decision on the non-implementation of the award under Article 21.289 These 
two rules indicate that the court’s function is not only examining the matter of 
substantive law but also examining the matter of legal procedures, which is different 
from the limited judicial review in the United States. In order to guarantee the 
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authoritativeness of grievance arbitration, the court’s judicial inquiry does not include 
examining matters of substantive law in the United States. Given the limited judicial 
review of arbitral awards, the success and fairness of an award depend on the 
professional arbitrators and the flexible procedure arbitration mechanism. For 
example, rules of evidence in arbitration are more flexible than in court proceedings. 
As long as the hearing is fairly conducted, all relevant evidence may be freely 
admitted and rules of judicial procedure need not be ascertained.290 Any party may 
offer evidence as they desire and shall provide additional evidence where the 
arbitrator may believe that it is necessary to understand and determine the dispute.291 
As for China, Article 6, 38, and 39 of the Labor Dispute Mediation and Arbitration 
Law provide for the right to cross-examination and debate in the process of arbitration 
and the responsibility of the party adducing evidence to back up its claims.292 The 
process of arbitration lacks flexibility as much as the process of the trial court system, 
especially with respect to getting the evidence.293 If Chinese legislators allow for a 
more flexible process of getting evidence, the efficiency of arbitration will be 
improved and the high rate of litigation might be decreased. And also in order to 
balance the efficiency of arbitration and equality of justice, limiting the court’s 
authority on matters of substantive law could increase efficiency at the cost of 
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293 Xudong Huang (黄旭东), supra note 271, at 225. 
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equality of justice if there are defects in the current arbitration mechanism and 
nonprofessional arbitrators in practice. Therefore, these challenges should be 
reviewed and improved thoughtfully and systematically.  
V. CONCLUSION  
The comparative analysis of labor laws and arbitrations mechanisms in the 
United States and the People’s Republic of China shows that the government should 
promote collective bargaining mechanisms, regulate industrial relations, and support 
the basic rights of workers in order to promote efficiency, equity, and industrial peace.  
With respect to industrial peace, legislators should focus on reforming labor 
laws related to collective negotiations and arbitration. Redefining the meaning of 
employees is the first important step to guarantee workers the right to join and 
organize union activities. As for now, China’s definition of employee is indirect and 
is only determined through explaining the meaning of employers and labor relations. 
Due to the unclear definition of employee, labor conflicts between labor and 
management result from workers who are not protected under the definition of 
employee. Broader coverage of employees is critical to protect workers’ fundamental 
rights in union activities. The organizing rights of employees is the second step for 
ensuring workers the rights to join, organize, and assist union activities. In order to 
strengthen workers’ organizing rights, the Chinese government would better 
incentivize workers’ motivation by setting up bottom-up trade unions instead of top-
down trade unions. As for unfair labor practices during the process of organizing, the 
Chinese government should clearly point out and classify unfair labor practices 
through codification in the labor laws. Remedies for the unfair labor practices of 
employers are additional protections for workers and restrict employers during 
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negotiations. Although the Trade Union Law provides certain remedies for non-
offending workers, like “a correction order”, they are not enough for employees for 
several reasons. The “correction order” issued by the administrative department of 
labor excessively relies on the power of the administrative department of labor and it 
is hard for workers to obtain one through the process of “letters and calls 
(shangfang)”. Additional remedies, therefore, should be added, such as giving access 
to the plant for union to present their views to put pressure on non-complying 
employers, and guaranteeing unions’ participation in the “letters and calls” process. 
Also, issuing a bargain order without the authorization cards when egregious conduct 
is occurring is a significant remedy for workers who are facing especially horrible 
treatment. 
Once negotiations fail, from an efficiency perspective, alternative dispute 
resolutions should protect workers’ rights and relieve labor conflicts. Arbitrations, as 
one method of alternative dispute resolution, are compulsory in China for both labor 
and employment disputes. In China’s arbitration system, three main challenges arise: 
union representatives rarely bring the labor dispute to the arbitration committee 
resulting in lower efficiency; compulsory arbitration is the mandatory first step after 
internal mediation between labor and management creating waste of judicial 
resources and lower efficiency; and guaranteeing the authoritativeness of arbitral 
awards without undermining equity. As for the first challenge, “interest arbitration” 
should be included in the process of labor arbitration instead of bringing it to the 
administrative department of labor to increase efficiency in the process of interest 
disputes. In addition, the union representing employees in the labor disputes 
arbitration is more efficient than no union participation. With respect to the second 
challenge, some scholars advocate the “arbitration or litigation” model, however, 
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given China’s increasing labor strife and imbalance of power between labor and 
management, this model cannot be adopted without a reform of labor arbitration. 
Moreover, in order to solve the problem of inefficiency in compulsory arbitration, 
self-selecting arbitrators might be the best method of relieving the burden of the 
arbitration committee. As for the last problem, the authoritativeness of arbitral awards 
should depend on the supporting labor laws and policies, as well as whether the union 
and employer can select their own choose arbitrators. And in order to balance the 
efficiency of arbitration and equity under judicial review, although some scholars 
argue for limiting the court’s authority on matters of substantive law to increase 
efficiency, this limitation harms equity because of the defects in the arbitration system 
and nonprofessional arbitrators in practice. The Chinese government, therefore, 
should pay more attentions to the challenges above when reconsidering labor laws 
and policies.  
In conclusion, rebuilding the collective negotiation mechanism through laws 
and policies is the best method to pursue industrial peace, efficiency, and equity. 
Lacking a collective bargaining (collective negotiation) system, workers have no 
choice but to resort to strikes and labor protests to ask for fair treatment. Unsolved 
labor disputes must then move on to the next step – the arbitration committee. With 
the increase in labor disputes, the arbitration committee’s ability to handle such a 
large number of disputes is undermined, lowering efficiency. Due to the changing 
global economy and shrinking shares of the labor market for China, the Chinese 
government must begin to reconsider how to set up a collective bargaining system 
with the attendance of employee organizations, and redefine the terminology in 
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1. Jiti Hetong Guiding (集体合同规定) [Provision on Collective Contracts] 
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